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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Petitioner,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

vs.
Case No: 20180847-SC

CALVIN PAUL STEWART,
Defendant / Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is the only logical, and only
constitutional, result of the problem this case presented. An indigent defendant
was convicted at trial and was not informed of his right to counsel on appeal, nor
was he provided the opportunity to have counsel appointed. His pro se attempt to
appeal failed due to his inability to perfect the appeal without professional
assistance. The court reasonably concluded that the constitutional right to appeal
was infringed when the defendant is not informed of the right to counsel. And in
terms of Rule 4(f), because the defendant had not been informed of the right to
counsel on appeal and not afforded access to appointed counsel, the defendant
was deprived of the right to appeal, even where he filed his own notice of appeal
and “gained entry” to the appellate process. The right to appeal is more than the
right to file notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted certiorari review on the following questions:
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1.

Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Rule 4(f) of

the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure permits reinstatement of an appeal, based
on a convicted defendant’s claim (after a trial) that he was not informed of his
right to counsel, after the defendant filed a timely pro se appeal.
2.

Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court’s

Determination that Stewart failed to meet his burden of demonstrating he was
not informed of his right to counsel on appeal.
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decisions of the court of appeals for
correctness. Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 628.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Factual and Procedural Overview
Calvin Paul Stewart was charged by amended information on October 10,
2001 with multiple felony counts of Securities Fraud, Sale of Unregistered
Securities, and Pattern of Unlawful Activity. R.032-36. Stewart was initially
represented by private counsel, Richard Mauro, who represented Stewart
through a preliminary hearing. R.024, 055, 058. However, before trial Mauro
moved to withdraw because Stewart was “presently without funds” and a public
defender was appointed. R.120, 146, 151-48. As trial approached, Stewart filed an
“Entry of Appearance” for himself. R.171-72. Stewart asked the Court to make a
public defender available as standby counsel. R.183. The Utah County Public
Defender Association filed opposition to the proposed appointment as standby
counsel. R.192-202. Eventually the Court released the public defender and
2

granted Stewart’s request to represent himself pro se at trial. R.210-12. According
to the Court minutes, Stewart was “fully advised of his rights to have counsel and
of procedural matters.” R.211. The Court informed Stewart that he would “be held
at the same standard as counsel if he represents himself”, and Stewart agreed to
proceed pro se. R.212. The Court told Stewart if he “changes his mind and wishes
to have counsel represent him at trial he must do so by May 1st.” R.212.
Before trial Stewart filed a number of pro se motions, including documents
entitled “Mandatory Judicial Notice” of his “Solemn Declaration” (R.219, 22126), “Notice of Claim of Foreign Sovereign Immunity” (R.312), “Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction” based on sovereign immunity (R.422), “Notice
of Felony” (R.471-72), “Notice of Removal of Judge” (R.527), “Notice for
Competency and Incompetence, Revocation of Power of Attorney and Firing all
Persons below and Demand to cease and desist” (R.533), and “Notice of
Withdrawal of Consent to Contract with the Forum Court” (R.558). It seems from
the record that these motions were fruitless. At trial Stewart was convicted of all
charges and ordered into custody for sentencing. R.570, 625.
Following trial Stewart continued to file unusual pleadings, including
“Notice of Mistrial Withdrawal of Consent” (R.634 [see Record Index]), and
“Affidavit of Truth” (R.641). At sentencing on August 14, 2003 the trial court
sentenced Stewart to prison on all 17 felony counts and ordered each count to run
consecutive to each other. R.679-82. The trial court “recommended to the board
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of pardons that the defendant serve at least 10 years and that when the defendant
is placed on parole that he is not to work in any fiduciary capacity.” R.682.
On September 12, 2003 Stewart filed a timely “Notice of Appeal” (R.68990) and an “Affidavit of Impecuniosity” (R.692-93) wherein Stewart notified the
trial court that “owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the expenses of the
appeal for an on behalf of CALVIN PAUL STEWART which I am about to take
and that I believe I am entitled of necessity to seek the relief sought by such
appeal.” On October 1, 2013 another document titled “Notice of Appeal” was filed,
this time signed by Gerrit Timmerman, but its contents actually appears to be a
request for transcripts. R.690-91. That was followed up with an Amended
Request for Trial Court Transcripts on October 6, 2013, again asking for “the
entire transcript of all recorded hearings”. R.705-06 (emphasis in original).
Stewart filed a request for an extension of time to file his docketing
statement with the Court of Appeals, and eventually he filed a docketing
statement. Following the receipt of the docketing statement, the Court of Appeals
issued a sua sponte Motion for Summary Disposition, claiming that the issues
raised in the docketing statement did not merit review. The State of Utah
responded to the Court of Appeals’ motion by objecting because it believed at
least one of the claims should be reviewed on appeal. The Court of Appeals then
withdrew its motion and set a briefing schedule, with Stewart’s brief being due
May 4, 2004. Stewart did not file a brief and the Court of Appeals dismissed the

4

appeal on June 2, 2004. The case was remitted to the district court on August 3,
2004.1
On February 5, 2007 Stewart filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel to
the district court but the Court did not rule on the motion for lack of a notice to
submit. On March 30, 2009 Stewart filed a “Motion to Correct Sentence Pursuant
to Rule 23(e) UR Crim P” (sic). On April 24, 2009 the court denied that motion.
In June of 2010 Stewart again filed an Affidavit of Impecuniosity along
with a Rule 60 “Motion for Relief from Void Judgment” and a request of
appointment of counsel. In August of 2010 the court denied the request for
counsel and, presumably, the motion for relief. On September 7, 2010 Stewart
filed a notice of appeal from that denial along with an Affidavit of Impecuniosity.
Again, the court of appeals found these claims to be without merit and filed
its own motion for summary disposition “on the basis that the grounds for relief
are so insubstantial as not to merit further consideration.” The court noted that
because the claims Stewart raised in his motion “relate to his underlying
conviction” his sole remedy was to raise the issue in a post-conviction relief
petition. See State v. Stewart, 2010 UT App 367 (per curiam).

This information comes from the court of appeal’s file in State v. Stewart, Case
No. 20030757-CA. Counsel for Stewart obtained a copy of this file from the court
archives. A scanned copy of this file was included on the CD with Appellant’s
electronic brief to the court of appeals and has been included as an addendum to
the electronic brief to this Court as well, though it is not included in the printed
brief.
1
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Stewart then petitioned to this Court for a Writ of Certiorari, again
requesting a waiver of the filing fees because of his indigence. A subsequent letter
from the Supreme Court noted that it “appears that you will not have the
assistance of an attorney in preparing papers for filing in this court” and provided
a “pro se guide” in hopes that it would be helpful. R.823. Ultimately Stewart’s
petition was denied without explanation. R.827.
Stewart’s Motion to Reinstate Direct Appeal
On April 15, 2015 Stewart filed his pro se “Motion to Reinstate Period for
Filing Direct Appeal Pursuant to Rule 4(f) URAppP” claiming his hearing
impairment was not addressed at trial, that he was not informed of his right to
appeal at sentencing, and was not informed of the right to counsel on appeal,
along with a “Motion to Appoint Counsel” with and “Affidavit of Impecuniousity”.
R.874-80. The State opposed the motion asserting that Stewart’s disabilities “did
not surface for at least eight months after the defendant was sentenced” and the
Utah Supreme Court “already denied his Appeal”. R.882-84. Stewart filed a pro
se reply denying that his hearing disability occurred after trial and sentencing.
R.885-87.
On August 12, 2015 the district court appointed the Utah County Public
Defender Association to represent Stewart and scheduled oral argument on the
motion to reinstate for October 7, 2015. R.911. At that hearing the parties and the
court agreed that Stewart’s pro se motion should be amended and set oral
argument. R.1180-83. Defendant, now represented by counsel, filed his
6

amendment to the motion to reinstate his appeal and asked the court to set an
evidentiary hearing. R.920-31. Stewart claimed he had been denied his right to
appeal because he had the constitutional right to counsel on appeal, but because
he was not informed of that right and was not offered appointment of counsel for
appeal, his appeal failed for lack of filing a brief. R.928-31.
The State responded to the merits2 of the claim by arguing that Stewart’s
claim failed because it did not fall within the “three circumstances” set out in
Manning. R.937. The State took the position that Stewart appeal was denied, but
only due to his own fault. R.938.
Stewart’s reply asserted that the circumstances in Manning were not the
only ways in which a person could demonstrate they had been denied their right
to appeal. R.946-47. Stewart claimed that the denial of his right to appeal, based
upon the trial court’s failure to inform him of his right to counsel on appeal, was
“self-evident based on his constitutional rights both to counsel and to appeal.”
R.947-48. Stewart cited cases from Kansas which established that principle.
R.948-49.
Evidentiary Hearing on Amended Motion to Reinstate (February 10, 2016)
Stewart testified that after being unable to afford his private counsel and
disagreeing with his appointed counsel, he ultimately represented himself at trial.

Most of the State’s arguments below focused on challenging the district court’s
jurisdiction to entertain Stewart’s motion to reinstate. The trial court eventually
concluded it did have jurisdiction to hear the motion. R.975-77. The question of
the trial court’s jurisdiction has not been challenged on appeal.
2
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R.1116-19. Stewart recalled that after his appointed counsel was released, the
judge informed him that if he did not have a new attorney soon, then he would
have to proceed without one. R.1124-25. Stewart understood this to mean that he
would have no further right to an attorney. R.1125. At that time, the trial court
did not inform him that he had a right to counsel on appeal. R.1119.
After his conviction, Stewart was sentenced to prison and remains
incarcerated there. R.1116, 1119. At sentencing the judge did not inform Stewart
of his right to appeal. R.1120. The court did not inform Stewart of the right to
have an attorney appointed to represent him on appeal. R.1120. If the judge had
informed Stewart of his right to an attorney on appeal he would have asked for
one because he “knew [that he] was way in over [his] head.” R.1120.
A non-attorney friend, Gerrit Timmerman, drafted the notice of appeal and
docketing statement for Stewart, and Stewart signed the docketing statement
while in court on another case. R.1120-21. Stewart hoped Timmerman would
provide more assistance but recalled:
The last time I talked to him I was in prison. I called him on
the phone. He asked me what grounds I wanted, I told him
that the main thing I wanted was the thing on the hearing, my
hearing problem. Other than that I told him, I don’t really
know enough about it to make any decisions. He asked me for
some money. I told him I didn’t have it. That was it.
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R.1121-22. At the prison Stewart wrote a letter to the contract attorneys asking for
assistance on his appeal but received a response that “they did not do appeals.”
R.1121.
Throughout the intervening years since his appeal was dismissed, Stewart
filed multiple petitions and motions without the help of an attorney. He testified,
“I kept requesting attorneys and it was kept being denied.” (sic) R.1122.3
District Court’s Ruling (July 18, 2016)
On June 29, 2016 the district court denied Stewart’s Motion to Reinstate
Period for Filing Direct Appeal for three reasons: first, the court held that
Stewart’s requests to represent himself in his jury trial and during sentencing,
coupled with his “choice” to proceed in his appeal pro se, amounted to a
“constructive waiver” of his right to an attorney on appeal. R.1154. Second, the
court held that Stewart was at fault in failing to meet the procedural hurdles of
the appellate process, barring him from relief under Rule 4(f). Id. And, third, the
court held that the significant delays in Stewart’s appeal, combined with a “mere
claim” by Stewart that he was not informed of his right to appellate counsel
created a dispositive lack of evidence. R.1155-57.
See R.737 (Motion for Appointment of Counsel, January 31, 2007); R.771
(Motion for Appointment of Counsel, June 14, 2010); R.776 (Affidavit of
Impecuniosity, June 21, 2010 [“I have no valuable assets that can be readily sold
to pay the costs of an attorney”]); R.797 (Notice to Submit for Decision on Motion
for Appoint of Counsel); R.811-12 (Affidavit of Impecuniosity, September 7,
2010); R.871 (Motion for Appointment of Counsel); R.874 (Motion to Reinstate
Period for Filing Direct Appeal Pursuant to Rule 4(f) URAppP, April 5, 2015
[“shall appoint counsel”]); R.877 (Motion for Appointment of Counsel, April 15,
2015); R.878 (Affidavit of Impecuniosity).
3
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Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
On August 16, 2018 the Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this
matter. State v. Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, --- P.3d ---. The court of appeals
agreed with Stewart that a “defendant is entitled to be informed of his right to
counsel on appeal, and this right is inherent in a defendant’s right to appeal.” Id.
at ¶14. This position is consistent with the 2018 amendment of Rule 22(c)(1) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that the sentencing court
“advise the defendant of defendant’s right to appeal… and the right to retain
counsel or have counsel appointed by the court if indigent.”
The court of appeals also held that the district court erred in denying
Stewart’s Motion to Reinstate Time to Appeal because Stewart demonstrated by a
preponderance of evidence that he was deprived of the right to appeal because he
was not informed of his right to counsel on appeal. Id. at ¶20. See also, UTAH R.
APP. PRO. 4(f).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The constitutional right to appeal includes the right to counsel on appeal.
The act of filing notice of appeal does not cure the deprivation of counsel on
appeal. When a defendant is deprived of counsel on appeal, his right to appeal is
deprived. The State’s reliance on one paragraph in Rees flies in the face of the rest
of the statutory, rules, and constitutional law regarding the right to counsel. The
court of appeals’ interpretation of Rule 4(f) and Manning is the correct and only
constitutional interpretation.

10

ARGUMENT
I.

The Court of Appeals Correctly Concluded that Rule 4(f) Permits
Reinstatement of Stewart’s Appeal Because He Was Deprived of a
Meaningful First Right of Appeal When He was Not Informed of
His Right Counsel on Appeal
At the heart of this review of the court of appeals’ decision is the essence of

what is required for a meaningful right to appeal and what constitutes a first
appeal of right. In concluding that Stewart had been denied such an opportunity
to his first right of appeal—though he had filed a pro se notice of appeal—the
court of appeals, contrary to the assertions of the State, got it right and correctly
applied Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and the remedial
holding and framework created by this Court in Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61,
122 P3d 628.
The scope of Rule 4(f), of Manning, and other decisions from state and
federal courts establish that the question of reinstatement of an appeal turns on
more than the simple act of filing a notice of appeal. It turns on far more
fundamental questions, and constitutional protections such as due process, equal
protection. It turns on fairness rather than a mechanical act. In this case,
Stewart did not choose to proceed pro se on his appeal from 17 felony convictions
following a jury trial for which he was sentenced to consecutive terms at the Utah
State Prison. Instead, he was unaware and unadvised as to the constitutional
protections afforded him to the right to counsel as an indispensable part of the
right to appeal.
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A. A direct appeal from a criminal conviction is an integral stage
of the criminal process where indigent defendants must be
afforded the assistance of counsel and advised that they have
the right to counsel on appeal
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in
“all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.

Moreover, the

right to counsel exists at “every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial
rights of a criminal accused might be effected.” Mempa v. Ray, 389 US 128, 134,
88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). This right has been combined with the due
process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to create a “duty of the trial
judge, where the accused is unable to employ counsel, to appoint counsel for
him.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932).
Moreover, “the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal appellant pursuing
a first appeal as of right certain minimum safeguards necessary to make that
appeal ‘adequate and effective,’ see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956);
among those safeguards is the right to counsel, see Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963).” Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 392, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d
821 (1985).
Similarly, Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution provides that “In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right… to appeal in all cases.” “This
shows that the drafters of our constitution considered the right of appeal
essential to a fair criminal proceeding. Rights guaranteed by our state
constitution are to be carefully protected by the courts. We will not permit them
12

to be lightly forfeited.” Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶11 (quoting State v. Tuttle,
713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985)). This Court, as cited by the court of appeals, has
also determined that the Utah Constitution assures that “an accused be provided
with the assistance of counsel at every important stage of the proceedings against
him.” Ford v. State, 2008 UT 66, ¶16, 199 P.3d 892 (quoting State v. Eichler,
483 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1971)). See also, Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶12.
That the right to counsel at trial is a separate right from the right to trial on
appeal is highlighted in Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83
S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). In that case two indigent defendants were given
counsel at the trial level, whom they subsequently dismissed. At trial, they were
convicted and sought counsel to appeal their convictions. They were denied
counsel because the California District Court of Appeals thought that “no good
whatever could be served by the appointment of counsel.” Douglas, 372 U.S. at
355. The Supreme Court concluded that indigent defendants had the right to
counsel on appeal because to hold otherwise would mean that “an
unconstitutional line had been drawn between rich and poor” Id. at 357. Implicit
in Douglas is the proposition that the right to counsel at trial and the right to
counsel on appeal are separate and distinct rights. This is so because the
defendants in Douglas had dismissed their trial counsel and proceed at trial pro
se, yet the Supreme Court did not conclude that this meant they had waived their
rights to counsel on appeal also.
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Accordingly, the right to the assistance of counsel on appeal must be
accorded to every criminal defendant. Accord State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37
(Utah 1981) (An indigent defendant “has the constitutional right to the
appointment of counsel to assist” him on appeal (citing Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814 (1963)). See also Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶12.
Thus, a critical part of the right to appeal is the right to counsel on appeal,
particularly for those indigent defendants who are pro se and/or have been
convicted at trial by a court or jury, and who wish to appeal.
B. The assistance of counsel is an “integral part” of the right to
appeal
Both Utah and federal courts have recognized that “the right to
representation is an integral part of the right to appeal.” Manning v. State, 2005
UT 61, ¶16. The United States Supreme Court has said, “In bringing an appeal as
of right from his conviction, a criminal appellant is attempting to demonstrate
that the conviction, with its consequent drastic loss of liberty, is unlawful. To
prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant must face an adversary proceeding
that—like trial—is governed by intricate rules that to a layperson would be
hopelessly forbidding.

An unrepresented appellant—like an unrepresented

defendant at trial—is unable to protect the vital interests at stake.” Evitts, 469
U.S. 387, 396. The Supreme Court has also stated:
The assistance of appellate counsel in preparing and submitting a brief to
the appellate court which defines the legal principles upon which the claims of
error are based and which designates and interprets the relevant portions of the
14

trial transcript may well be of substantial benefit to the defendant. This
advantage may not be denied to a criminal defendant, solely because of his
indigency, on the only appeal which the State affords him as a matter of right.
Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 259, 87 S. Ct. 996, 18 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1967) (per
curiam). In addition, see Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶12.
Moreover, the entire statutory appellate procedural framework concerning
appeals for indigent appellants in Utah is built around the importance of the
assistance of counsel during a first appeal of right. For example, Rule 4(f)—a rule
at issue here—mandates the appointment of counsel for indigent, unrepresented
defendants who seek reinstatement of their right to appeal. In addition, Rule
38A(a)(1) provides that no attorney in a case where the client has the right to
competent counsel may withdraw from the appeal unless that withdrawal is
granted by court order. And Rule 38A(a)(2) reads in part, “[I]f a party has a right
to effective assistance of counsel through the first appeal as of right, an attorney
appointed to represent that party on appeal shall represent that party
throughout the first appeal of right, respond to a petition for writ of certiorari, file
a petition for writ of certiorari if appointed counsel determines that such a
petition is warranted, and brief and argue the merits if the Supreme Court grants
certiorari review” (emphasis added). Finally, Rule 38B(a) mandates that, “In all
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appeals where a party is entitled to appointed counsel, only an attorney proficient
in appellate practice may be appointed to represent such a party…”4
Furthermore, Utah appellate courts have been reluctant to allow the
withdrawal of appellate counsel except in rare cases where either the appellant’s
actions require that withdrawal be granted, or where counsel’s failure to comply
with the appellate rules, require the appointment of new counsel. For example,
in State v. Allgier, 2015 UT 6, ¶6, 353 P.3d 50, this Court, on a motion to
withdraw filed by appointed appellate counsel, examined whether Allgier through
repeated and “extreme dilatory, disruptive, and threatening conduct” had
forfeited “his right to counsel for the limited remainder of the proceedings on
appeal.” In the district court, Allgier pled guilty “which substantially reduced the
available issues on appeal.” Id. at ¶12. In considering this issue, this Court
acknowledged that forfeiture “is a drastic measure” and that “a defendant must
engage in extreme conduct involving dilatory or abusive behavior before it may
be imposed.” Id. at ¶10. This Court recognized the critical role counsel plays in
criminal appeals such as, “Without [] attorneys, many defendants would be
deprived of significant constitutional rights.” This Court also stated that:
In fact, to ensure adherence to Rule 38B, a Standing Committee on Appellate
Representation has now been created, “To establish a standing Committee to
assist the Board of Appellate Court Judges to determine a roster of attorneys
eligible for appointment to represent indigent parties on appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals.” Rule 11-401, Utah Judicial Council
Code of Judicial Administration. Additionally, “The Board of Appellate Judges
shall create and maintain an appellate roster of attorneys skilled in handling
criminal, juvenile delinquency, and abuse, neglect and dependency appeals.” Id.
at subsection (2).
4
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In this particular case, Mr. Allgier pled guilty, which substantially
reduced the available issues on appeal, and he already has received
the fundamental benefits of counsel on appeal in the form of a brief
submitted by counsel that addresses those challenges. The only
remaining stages of appellate review in which counsel would
participate are the filing of a reply brief and oral argument. The
purpose of a reply brief is to permit a response to contentions raised
by an appellee for the first time in its brief in opposition.
Consequently, in the absence of any new contentions, attorneys on
appeal legitimately may forgo the filing of a reply brief without
depriving their clients of the right to counsel. Oral argument is for
the benefit of the court. It traditionally conducts argument for cases
presented to it, but it retains the discretion to decline arguments
already presented in his brief. Thus, the practical scope of any
remaining right to counsel on appeal in this particular case is much
more limited than at any other phase of the trial or appellate
proceedings.
Id. at ¶12. Ultimately, this Court concluded that “Under the unique procedural
posture presented by this appeal, where the only step in the proceedings is the
filing of a reply brief, Mr. Allgier has forfeited his right to counsel for the
remainder of the appellate proceedings” and that if he chose to file a pro se reply
brief, he “should also strive to comply with all applicable rules to the extent he is
able.” Id. at ¶14.
C. A defendant must be aware of his right to counsel in order to
exercise it, and knowingly waive it
The court of appeals correctly concluded that “A defendant must be aware
of this right [to counsel on appeal] in order to exercise it.” Stewart, 2018 UT App
151, ¶19. In support of this conclusion the court of appeals cited to a number of
opinions around the country that support this position that the “right to appeal at
the expense of the state is mere illusion if the convicted indigent defendant does
not know such right exists.” Id. at ¶13, n.3 (other citation omitted). In addition,
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Rule 22(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure has been amended to now
require that defendants must not only be advised of their right to appeal and the
time to appeal, but also that they have “the right to retain counsel or have counsel
appointed by the court if indigent.” This amendment to the rules, contrary to the
State’s argument, gives provided an explicit reminder to trial court as to this
constitutional requirement that has always existed. The rule did not create the
right.
The State argues that at the time of Stewart’s sentencing there was no
requirement that he be advised that he had the right to have appellate counsel
appointed. Petitioner’s Br. at 24. However, this position completely ignores the
fact that, as established above, the right to counsel on appeal for indigent
defendants is constitutionally mandated, and that right has been recognized by
state and federal courts for decades. See also Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶13, n.3.
Accordingly, it is only logical and correct that if a right exists, it can’t be properly
exercised without knowledge of the existence of that right and proper advisement
by the courts, who bear the ultimate responsibility of ensuring that criminal
proceedings—including direct appeals—are fundamentally fair.
As set forth above, a direct appeal—which includes the right to counsel—is
a critically important part of the criminal proceedings with constitutional
implications such as due process and fundamental fairness. Indigent defendants
have a right to counsel during the criminal proceedings in the trial courts and on
appeal.

“Because a defendant’s choice of self-representation often results in
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detrimental consequences to the defendant, a trial court must be vigilant to
assure that the choice is freely and expressly made ‘with eyes wide open.’” State v.
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶15, 979 P.3d 799 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975)).

Moreover, courts should “indulge every reasonable

presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461 (1938). In addition, “In
ascertaining whether a [defendant] has knowingly and voluntarily wavied the
right to the assistance of counsel, the trial court bears a heavy responsibility to
adequately protect the rights of the accused.” State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,
1248 (Utah 1988).
While the above quotes were mostly made in the context of selfrepresentation during the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, the same holds
true for self-representation on appeal. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has
rejected a similar argument presented by the State of Michigan that a defendant
who entered a no contest plea waived his right to appointed counsel on appeal.
The Court noted that because the sentencing court did not inform him of the
relevant right (to be appointed appellate counsel) his plea did not constitute a
knowing and intelligent waiver. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 623, 125 S.Ct.
2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005) (citing Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (“Waiver of
the right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally,
must be a knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances” (other citation omitted)).

19

Here, “the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court
erroneously concluded that Stewart had constructively waived his right to counsel
on appeal “by repeatedly requesting to represent himself at trial and sentencing
and then proceeding pro se in his appeal.” Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶15. “A
defendant does not constructively waive the right to an attorney on appeal by
opting to represent himself at the trial level, and the State does not cite any
controlling authority to the contrary.” Id. at ¶16. The trial court may have stated
“that Stewart ‘repeatedly was notified of his right to counsel,’ those notifications
occurred at the trial level, with respect to the trial, and there is no evidence the
court informed him he was entitled to the assistance of counsel on appeal.” Id.
“[W]aiver may not be presumed from a silent record. ‘The record must
show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show that an accused
was offered counsel but intelligently and understandably rejected the offer.
Anything less is not a waiver.’’ State v. Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1986)
(quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70
(1962)). A close examination of the district court record demonstrates that there
was a colloquy on the record between the district court and Stewart about the
decision to waive counsel “at trial.” R.211. Stewart chose to represent himself at
trial. At the conclusion of trial after the jury had convicted Stewart of all 17
counts, the district court took Stewart into custody prior to sentencing. R.1082.
There was no discussion on the record where Stewart was informed that he could
be represented at sentencing. R.1081-82.
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Furthermore, while there is no

transcript of the sentencing hearing (though it was requested by Stewart), there is
no mention in the sentencing order that Stewart had been informed of his right to
counsel on appeal and there is no record of any waiver by Stewart of that right—
unlike the minute entry from the hearing on March 18, 2003, which details where
Stewart was again advised of his right to counsel at trial and that he knowingly
and voluntarily waived that right. R.211, 647-51. These facts, when combined
with the supporting evidence presented by Stewart at the hearing on his motion
to reinstate, unequivocally support the court of appeals’ conclusion that the
district court erred in “determining that Stewart constructively waived this right
[to counsel] on appeal.” Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶ 16.
D. Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides a
procedural framework to protect the constitutional right of
appeal by allowing the reinstatement for the filing of a direct
appeal for a defendant who was unconstitutionally deprived
of the right to appeal
Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in relevant part reads:
“Upon a showing that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal
the trial court shall reinstate the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal.” This
rule also mandates that counsel “shall” be appointed “if the defendant is not
represented and is indigent.” The reason for the mandatory appointment of
counsel is that this Court in both Johnson and Manning recognized that when
the question arises whether a defendant was deprived of a fundamental right—a
first appeal of right—then there must be an avenue to seek redress of that
deprivation with the assistance of counsel as opposed to through post-conviction
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relief which is strictly civil in nature and where no right to counsel under Utah
law exists. See Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶16 (“By contrast, a Johnson motion filed
in the underlying criminal case guarantees the right to state-paid counsel in
seeking a first appeal.[] This is important because the right to representation is
an integral part of the right to appeal Johnson sought to protect”).
This rule was promulgated after this Court’s decision in Manning.5 In
Manning this Court disavowed the remedy established in State v. Johnson, 635
P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), clarified “what constitutes a denial of the constitutional
right to appeal,” and “outlined “a new procedure to restore the right to appeal for
a defendant who proves, under the framework we provide, that he has not
knowingly or voluntarily waived” his right to appeal. Manning, ¶11.
Manning held, “A criminal defendant may no longer seek Johnson
resentencing to restore a denied right to appeal. Rather, we set forth a new
procedural mechanism for this purpose, requiring a defendant to file a motion in
the trial court for reinstatement of a denied right to appeal under the exceptions
outlined above. These exceptions permit defendants to file a motion in their
underlying criminal cases in the trial court, thereby qualifying them for
assistance of counsel in restoring a denied right to appeal pursuant to article I,
section 12 of the Utah Constitution.” Id. at ¶42.

The Advisory Committee Note to this rule indicates it “was adopted to
implement the holding and procedure outlined in Manning.”
5
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At the heart of the decision in Manning was the need to fashion a
“procedure for reinstating an unconstitutionally denied criminal appeal.” 2005
UT 61, ¶ 27 (“Since we have no remedy currently in place under the PCRA or our
rules of appellate procedure for reinstating an unconstitutionally denied criminal
appeal, we must again fashion such a remedy, as we did in Johnson”). See also
Stewart, ¶11. This Court noted that “Virtually all jurisdictions provide some
procedural mechanism for restoring a denied right to appeal, and we have a
particular interest in doing so because of our constitutional mandate to provide a
criminal appeal ‘in all cases.’ UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 12. Further, failure to provide
a direct appeal from a criminal case implicates the guarantee of due process
under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703,
705 n.1 (Utah 1985), when a defendant has ‘been prevented in some meaningful
way from proceeding’ with a first appeal of right, State v. Penman, 964 P.2d
[1157], 1166 [(Wilkins, J., concurring)]”.
In Manning, this Court outlined “several possible circumstances that would
demonstrate that a defendant ‘ha[d] been unconstitutionally deprived, through
no fault of his own, of [the] right to appeal,’ including, among others, situations
in which ‘the court or the defendant’s attorney failed to properly advise defendant
of the right to appeal.’” Stewart, ¶11 (quoting Manning, ¶31).

This Court

recognized, however, that this list of qualified circumstances “is not intended to
be exclusive.” Manning, n.11.
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Moreover, this Court also indicated that an important consideration in
whether a defendant has been unconstitutionally deprived is if restoration or
reinstatement of a direct appeal “is in the interest of fundamental fairness.”6 A
defendant “who is unconstitutionally denied his right to appeal”, must have “a
means of regaining that right. It follows that there must be a mechanism for
distinguishing those defendants who have truly exhausted their remedy of direct
appeal from those whose right to appeal has been unconstitutionally denied.”
Manning, ¶24.
E. Though Stewart, pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal, he was
deprived of his first right of appeal in a meaningful way
because he was both unaware and unadvised by any court
that he had the right to counsel on direct appeal
Stewart was convicted of 17 felonies and was sentenced to consecutive terms
in the Utah State Prison. He chose to represent himself at trial and knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at trial.

However, he was not

informed that he also had a constitutional right to have counsel appointed on
appeal, and he made no knowing or voluntary waiver of the right. Accordingly,
In Tuttle, this Court also acknowledged the “fundamental nature of the right to
appellate review of a criminal conviction.” 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985). Tuttle
reconsidered the question of whether defendants who escape from custody are
entitled to have their appeals reinstated. Tuttle escaped from the Utah State
Prison after the filing of a notice of appeal. While he was free, his appeal was
dismissed. However, following Tuttle’s return to prison, this Court “reinstated
the appeal by minute order.” Id. at 703. This Court also stated, “refusing to
reinstate the appeals of escapees necessarily operates to punish only those with
meritorious grounds for appeal, for those whose appeals lack merit will obtain no
relief under any circumstances. The foregoing suggests that refusing to reinstate
appeals of those who escape and are returned to custody raises serious due
process and equal protection questions under the Utah Constitution.” Id. at 705
(citations omitted).
6
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pro se and with the help of a friend, he filed a notice of appeal and then a
docketing statement.

However, he failed to file a brief and his appeal was

dismissed.7
The State contends that it matters not if Stewart was advised of his right to
counsel on appeal because he filed a notice of appeal and that is the only thing
required to establish there was no deprivation of the right to appeal or any
meaningful prevention from proceeding with his appeal. See State v. Rees, 2005
UT 69, ¶18, 125 P.3d 874.
1. The court of appeals correctly concluded the Rees does
not apply to Stewart
In making the argument that because Stewart filed a pro se notice of
appeal, he, therefore, was not prevented in some meaningful way from
proceeding with his appeal, the State relies on a single, short paragraph in this
Court’s opinion in State v. Rees, 2005 UT 69. Paragraph 18 in Rees reads: “We
construe the act of ‘proceeding’ with an appeal to encompass filing a notice of
appeal, not more. Defendants who gain entry to appellate courts and have their
appeals concluded either by a ruling on the merits or involuntary dismissal have
exhausted their remedy of direct appeal [].”
The court of appeals found this language from Rees inapplicable to Stewart
because Rees “did not contemplate a situation in which a defendant was denied
Case No. 20030757-CA. Stewart’s brief was due on May 4, 2004 and his appeal
was dismissed on June 2, 2004. On the same day the briefing schedule was set
by the court of appeals and mailed to Stewart at the Utah State Prison, the court
received a change of address from Stewart indicating he was housed at the
Central Utah Correctional Facility in Gunnison.
7
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the right of appeal by being denied the right to counsel. Indeed, in Rees, the
defendant was represented by counsel, but alleged that his counsel was
ineffective.

The court in Rees did not address whether the right to appeal

includes the right to be represented by counsel, or specifically whether a
defendant must be informed of the right to counsel on appeal.” Stewart, 2018
UT App 151, n.1 (citing Rees, ¶9).
The court of appeals correctly concluded that the facts here are completely
different than in Rees, where Rees was represented by counsel on appeal and the
merits of that appeal were reached (2001 UT App 27).

Rees, ¶¶2-4.

Subsequently, Rees sought reinstatement of his direct appeal through a Rule 65B
post-conviction motion. Id. at ¶5. Rees alleged “generally that he did not receive
a meaningful appeal because some of the records had not been filed with the
court of appeals” and he implicitly “suggested” that his “attorney had been
ineffective” in perfecting his original appeal. Id.
Rees could not allege that he was deprived of his first right of appeal when
the merits were reached on appeal and he had appellate counsel. Moreover,
Rees, this Court concluded had an adequate remedy at law for his ineffectiveness
claim under the Postconviction Remedies Act and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rees, ¶¶16, 20 (“Based upon the foregoing, we hold that Mr.
Rees’s claim does not implicate an unconstitutional denial of his right to appeal
and that despite the unfavorable outcome of his appeal, he has exhausted his
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right to appeal and is therefore required to prosecute his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under the PCRA and rule 65C”).
2. Paragraph 18 of Rees is in conflict with the remedy set
forth in Rule 4(f), with Manning, with other more
relevant language in Rees, and with the decisions from
the United States Supreme Court and should be
disavowed by this Court
The plain language of Rule 4(f) indicates that reinstatement of the time to
appeal—reinstatement of the right to a direct appeal—is available upon “a
showing that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal.”
In Manning, this Court outlined “several possible circumstances that
would demonstrate that a defendant ‘ha[d] been unconstitutionally deprived,
through no fault of his own, of [the] right to appeal,’ including, among others,
situations in which ‘the court or the defendant’s attorney failed to properly advise
defendant of the right to appeal.’” Stewart, ¶11 (quoting Manning, ¶31). This
Court recognized, however, that this list of qualified circumstances “is not
intended to be exclusive.” Manning, n.11. Moreover, this Court in Manning also
indicated that an important consideration in whether a defendant has been
unconstitutionally deprived is if restoration or reinstatement of a direct appeal “is
in the interest of fundamental fairness.”8 A defendant “who is unconstitutionally
In Tuttle, this Court also acknowledged the “fundamental nature of the right to
appellate review of a criminal conviction.” 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985). Tuttle
reconsidered the question of whether defendants who escape from custody are
entitled to have their appeals reinstated. Tuttle escaped from the Utah State
Prison after the filing of a notice of appeal. While he was free, his appeal was
dismissed. However, following Tuttle’s return to prison, this Court “reinstated
the appeal by minute order.” Id. at 703. This Court also stated, “refusing to
8
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denied his right to appeal”, must have “a means of regaining that right. It follows
that there must be a mechanism for distinguishing those defendants who have
truly exhausted their remedy of direct appeal from those whose right to appeal
has been unconstitutionally denied.” Manning, ¶24.
And in Rees, this Court reiterated from Manning that a “different status”
attaches “to those defendants who have been unconstitutionally denied their
right to appeal. We have interpreted a ‘denial’ to have constitutional implications
when a defendant has ‘been prevented in some meaningful way from proceeding
with [his] appeal[].” Rees, ¶17, see Manning, ¶24. Moreover, the court further
emphasized that “meaningful” equates to “the type of conduct or circumstance
that deprived a defendant of access to the appellate process.” Id. at ¶19.
Paragraph 18 of Rees, construes “the act of ‘proceeding’ with an appeal to
encompass filing a notice of appeal, not more.”

This narrow definition of

proceeding9 is contrary to the larger purpose of Rule 4(f) which makes the
emphasis on deprivation of the right to appeal—or as Manning (and Rees) make
reinstate the appeals of escapees necessarily operates to punish only those with
meritorious grounds for appeal, for those whose appeals lack merit will obtain no
relief under any circumstances. The foregoing suggests that refusing to reinstate
appeals of those who escape and are returned to custody raises serious due
process and equal protection questions under the Utah Constitution.” Id. at 705
(citations omitted).
9
As opposed to the following: “Proceedings: The steps or measures taken in the
course of an action, including all that are taken” (Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd
Edition Online)). Proceeding: (legal definition): “a particular step or series of
steps in the enforcement, adjudication, or administration of rights, remedies,
laws, or regulations” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Online)).
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clear—on the unconstitutional denial of the right to appeal when a defendant has
been prevented in some meaningful way from exercising that right to appeal.
This is especially true where the United States Supreme Court has now classified
the filing of a notice of appeal as a “purely ministerial task” and a “simple,
nonsubstantive act.”

Garza v. Idaho, 2019 U.S. Lexis 1596, __ S.Ct. ___

(February 27, 2019). The Supreme Court has also said, “In bringing an appeal as
of right from his conviction, a criminal appellant is attempting to demonstrate
that the conviction, with its consequent drastic loss of liberty, is unlawful. To
prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant must face an adversary proceeding
that—like trial—is governed by intricate rules that to a layperson would be
hopelessly forbidding.

An unrepresented appellant—like an unrepresented

defendant at trial—is unable to protect the vital interests at stake.” Evitts, 469
U.S. 387, 396.
Finally, Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d (1988), is
a decision from the United States Supreme Court that is controlling here.
Appointed appellate counsel for Penson (who was indigent and imprisoned for a
term of 18-28 years) sought to withdraw as counsel because he believed the
appeal to be “meritless.” Id. at 78. The following ensued:
A week later, the Court of Appeals entered an order allowing
appellate counsel to withdraw and granting petitioner 30 days in
which to file an appellate brief pro se. The order further specified
that the court would thereafter "independently review the record
thoroughly to determine whether any error exists requiring reversal
or modification of the sentence . . . ." Thus, counsel was permitted to
withdraw before the court reviewed the record on nothing more than
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"a conclusory statement by the appointed attorney on appeal that the
case has no merit and that he will file no brief." Moreover, although
granting petitioner several extensions of time to file a brief, the court
denied petitioner's request for the appointment of a new attorney.
No merits brief was filed on petitioner's behalf.
In due course, and without the assistance of any advocacy for
petitioner, the Court of Appeals made its own examination of the
record to determine whether petitioner received "a fair trial and
whether any grave or prejudicial errors occurred therein." As an
initial matter, the court noted that counsel's certification that the
appeal was meritless was "highly questionable." In reviewing the
record and the briefs filed by counsel on behalf of petitioner's
codefendants, the court found "several arguable claims. Indeed, the
court concluded that plain error had been committed in the jury
instructions concerning one count.
Id. at 78-79 (citations to the lower court’s opinion omitted). The Ohio Court of
Appeals reversed on one count and affirmed the other on the other counts. The
Ohio Supreme Court refused to hear the matter. Id. at 79.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The
Court emphasized the constitutional guarantee a criminal appellant has to be
represented on a first appeal of right. Id. The Court addressed the interplay
between its prior decisions in Douglas and Anders. However, more important is
the recognition that “the right to be represented is among the most fundamental
of rights”; and that “it is through counsel that all other rights of the accused are
protected: ‘Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be
represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to
assert any other rights he may have.’” Id. at 84-85 (other citations omitted).
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So, while Stewart may have filed a notice of appeal pro se, he was deprived
of—unconstitutionally denied—his first appeal of right because he was denied the
right to counsel and the right to meaningful access to the appellate process.
The focus of the court of appeals’ opinion was exactly right. The issue here
is not whether the ministerial act of filing a notice of appeal was filed, pro se, by
Stewart. The issue as to reinstatement is whether he was constitutionally
deprived of his right to appeal by being denied the right to counsel because the
trial court failed to advise and inform him that he had the right to be represented
at this critical stage of the criminal proceedings. This Court in State v. Collins,
2014 UT 61, ¶31, 342 P.3d 789, stated, “Our use of the term ‘deprived’ [in
Manning] was crucial because the word encompasses a narrow range of
situations where a defendant would have appealed, but had that right ‘taken
away’ or was ‘[k]ept from the possession, enjoyment, or use’ of that right”
(quoting Webster’s Third International Dictionary 606 (202) (defining “deprive
as 1 obs: to take away . . . 3: to keep from the possession, enjoyment, or use of
something")). Stewart had his right to appeal “taken away” or he was “kept” from
the use of that right because he was denied access to appellate counsel due to the
failure of the district court to inform him of that right to counsel.
Under Rule 4(f), this Court’s decisions, and decisions from the United States
Supreme Court, it is clear that indigent defendants who are not advised and do
not waive their right to appellate counsel, are denied their first right of appeal
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because the assistance of counsel is fundamental to exercising that right to
appeal.
II.

The Court of Appeals Correctly Determined that Stewart Met His
Burden of Demonstrating by a Preponderance of Evidence that
He was Not Informed of His Right to Counsel on Appeal
The second issue the Court granted review over is whether the court of

appeals erred in reversing the district court’s determination that Stewart failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating he was not informed of his right to counsel on
appeal. The State’s position depends upon this Court construing the court of
appeals decision in ways not supported by the language of the decision itself and
upon this Court construing the district court’s ruling in ways not supported by
the language of the ruling itself. In order for the State’s complaint to be valid, this
Court will have to find that the court of appeals made a credibility determination
when it explicitly said it was not doing that. In order for the State’s complaint to
be valid, this Court will have to find the district court based its conclusion on
factual findings and credibility determinations when it explicitly said it was
basing its conclusion on legal rules. Instead of twisting the decisions of these two
courts beyond recognition, this Court should read the rulings for what they say
and conclude that the court of appeals rejection of the district court’s ruling was a
legal, not a factual one.
A. The court of appeals did not make its own factual findings, it
corrected the district court’s legal errors
The State claims the court of appeals “improperly substitut[ed] its weighing
of the evidence for the trial court’s.” Petitioner’s Brief at 26. The State interprets
32

the court of appeals’ holding as requiring “that the trial court had to (1) find that
Stewart’s testimony was credible because it was uncontradicted, and (2) conclude
that Stewart’s testimony alone met his burden of proof.” Petitioner’s Brief at 27
(citing Stewart, ¶22). This interpretation of the court of appeals’ decision is
incorrect. It misconstrues what the court of appeals actually held and ignores the
district court’s own ruling which led directly to the language used by the court of
appeals.
The State’s brief does not actually quote much the court of appeals or the
district court’s rulings. Instead the State describes “in essence” what the court of
appeals’ opinion says. Petitioner’s Brief at 27. The State characterizes the court of
appeals as having replaced the district court’s factual findings with its own, but
nothing even close to that happened. So rather than rely on the State’s
interpretation of the court of appeals’ reading of the district court’s findings and
conclusions, it is useful to consider the exact language of the two courts below.
First, from the district court’s ruling:
Stewart has not supplied a transcript nor a copy of a transcript
of his sentencing hearing. A mere claim by Mr. Stewart, 11
years after sentencing, that he is quite sure the sentencing
judge did not inform of his right to the appointment of
appellate counsel is simply insufficient. The lack of evidence is
critical in the estimation of this Court and is dispositive. This
Court needs ‘facts in the record or determined through
additional evidentiary hearings, that he has been
unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault of his own, of his
right to appeal.’ Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 31. A ‘preponderance
of the evidence’ standard cannot simply be ignored or glossed
over by this Court. UTAH R. APP. PRO. 4(f).
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R.1156 (emphasis added). Nowhere in the its ruling does the district court even
hint at whether it considered Stewart’s testimony to be credible. The State wants
this Court to presume that the trial court, by using the terms “mere claim” and
“insufficient”, was signaling that it did not find Stewart’s testimony credible. But
to do so would be to do exactly what the State says an appellate court cannot do,
to make a factual finding where none was made below, to replace the district
court’s factual findings (or in this instance a lack of finding) with its own.
The district court characterizing the testimony as a “mere claim” and
“insufficient” does not imply that the district court believed Stewart was lying.
Rather, characterizing this testimony that way was directed at criticizing
memory-based testimony itself as being inadequate to prove anything that
could/should be proved by reference to the court record. The court began with
the incorrect legal presumption that such testimony was “simply insufficient” to
prove what Stewart was told at sentencing. This is made clear where the district
court criticized Stewart’s claim as “lack[ing] evidence” because he was unable to
supply a transcript of the sentencing hearing.
Although it is unclear what the court thought Stewart’s testimony at the
evidentiary hearing was, it is clear that it believed it did not constitute “facts…
determined through additional evidentiary hearings”, as required under
Manning. R.1156. The language of the district court’s ruling makes its meaning
and intentions clear, it was not even hinting at a credibility problem. It was
finding as a matter of law, that anything short of a transcript of the sentencing
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hearing would be insufficient to support Stewart’s claim that he was not informed
of the right to counsel. The court began with the assumption that the
preponderance of evidence standard could not be satisfied with mere testimonial
claims about what was said at that hearing.
It is in light of the district court’s specific ruling, in light of the district
court’s peculiar take on the capacity of memory-based testimony to prove a
relevant fact, that the court of appeals language must be viewed. The court of
appeals was directly addressing the idea that the district court was claiming, as
matter of law, a prima facia case could not be met based solely on Stewart’s
testimony.
Although the district court has discretion to weigh the importance
and the credibility of the evidence, it characterized Stewart’s
testimony as a ‘mere claim’ and stated that the ‘lack of evidence’ did
not meet the preponderance standard of proof. We disagree.
Stewart’s uncontroverted testimony was evidence that he was not
informed of his right to appellate counsel. Stewart bore the burden of
proof and offered his testimony as evidence. No other evidence was
offered, either by Stewart or by the State, and the court did not make
findings that Stewart’s testimony was incredible or unreliable. This
means that the only evidence presented tended to prove that Stewart
was not informed of the right to counsel on appeal, thus making it
‘more likely than not’ that Stewart was not so informed. Because the
State offered no evidence to the contrary and because the court did
not find that the evidence presented was incredible or unreliable, the
court clearly erred in determining Stewart did not demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was not informed of his right
to counsel on appeal.
Stewart, ¶22. The court of appeals’ language is clear, it is not interfering with the
district court’s discretion to weigh and make credibility determinations of the
evidence, it is not re-weighing any evidence. It is only preventing the district
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court from applying an incorrect presumption, from mischaracterizing sworn
testimony, which had not been impeached or contradicted, as “simply
insufficient.” It was only overruling the district court conclusion as a matter of
law that this kind of evidence constituted a “lack of evidence.” The State wants to
twist the court of appeals’ language into something it is not. But viewed on its
own terms, without the State’s distillation into its ‘essence,’ the court of appeals is
not making its own factual findings or credibility determination, it is making a
legal conclusion about the competency of memory-based testimony and the
preponderance of evidence standard.
The State’s citation to “binding precedent” is of no use to its claim because
the district court’s ruling had nothing to do with factual findings. Petitioner’s
Brief at 27. For example, the first case it relies upon is Mower v. McCarthy, 245
P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 1952). It appears the State wants to argue that Mowers was
binding on the court of appeals to “‘assume that the trier of facts found them in
accord with its decision,’ and ‘affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be
reasonable to find facts to support it.’” Petitioner’s Brief at 27. But what the
State’s citation to Mower ignores the language of the trial court’s ruling in this
case. This is not a case like Mower where the lower court made no findings of fact
on the record but came to a legal conclusion that was necessarily based upon
implicit factual findings.
The district court’s conclusion, that Stewart failed to meet his burden of
proof, is not based on some undisclosed but necessary factual findings, it was
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explicitly based on erroneous legal rules. For the district court, regardless of the
credibility of Stewart’s testimony, without other evidence, and specifically
without a transcript of the sentencing hearing, he could not establish by a
preponderance what occurred at sentencing. So, Mowers’ requirement that
appellate courts presume the trier of fact made factual findings that support the
legal conclusions is inapplicable because the district court’s conclusion was not
based on facts, it was based on the judge’s incorrect understanding of competent
evidence.
The State’s citation to this Court’s alternative reasoning in Ruiz fails too.
There the Court reversed the court of appeals because the basis of the trial court’s
decision was apparent on the record, but even if it wasn’t remand, rather than
reversal was appropriate. Petitioner’s Brief at 29. One thing is similar between
Ruiz and this case, the reason for the district court’s decision was apparent on the
record. But the obvious reason in Ruiz was a factual matter, a point the district
court has ultimate discretion over, and thus if there had been ambiguities in
justification they must be clarified by the district court. The reason for the district
court’s ruling in this case was legal, a matter the district court is afforded no
discretion. And because there is no ambiguity in the record, because we know the
judge found Stewart failed to meet his burden because memory-based testimony
(as opposed to a transcript) was legally insufficient, there is no need to remand.
And citation to State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ¶24, 282 P.3d 998 for the
proposition that remand is required where the factual findings are ambiguous
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fails for the same reason. There is no ambiguity in the facts below and no reason
to have to wonder what factual basis the district court used to conclude Stewart
failed to meet his burden. Facts were not the basis of the court’s decision; a legal
error was. The State is wrong when it claims the court of appeals was obligated to
remand for findings when it stated the district court did not make findings about
Stewart’s credibility. Petitioner’s Brief at 29. It was wrong because the district
court’s ruling was clearly not made on the basis of the facts or an implied or
ambiguous credibility determination.
The court of appeals was not addressing a factual controversy, it was
correcting a legal error. The district court’s conclusion, that Stewart had failed to
prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, was not based on the district
court’s weighing of the evidence, not based upon a credibility determination. The
district court’s conclusion was a legal one based on the incorrect premise that, in
order for Stewart to prove his claim, his own testimony was legally insufficient.
The court concluded, regardless of Stewart’s credibility or lack thereof, without
proof in the form of a transcript of the sentencing hearing, Stewart could not
prove that the sentencing court did not inform him of his right to counsel on
appeal.
This Court should reject the State’s alteration of the court of appeals’
decision and reject its claim that the court of appeals replaced the district courts
factual findings with its own. The language of the district court’s ruling makes it
clear that it did not care what Stewart’s testimony was or how credible he was,
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without a transcript Stewart could not prove by a preponderance that he was not
informed of his right to counsel on appeal. Because this was a legal error, the
court of appeals correction of that error did not interfere with the district court’s
discretion. This Court should affirm the court of appeals and refute the State’s
attempts to reframe the issue by reframing the ruling and decision below.
B. Stewart’s
evidence

evidence

satisfied

the

preponderance

of

the

After concluding that the district court had incorrectly characterized
Stewart’s sworn and uncontradicted testimony as a “mere claim”, the court of
appeals turned to the question of what was required to prove Stewart’s
deprivation claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The court noted what
evidence was presented, which was Stewart’s testimony that he was not informed
and his recollection of the notes he took regarding the sentencing hearing.
Stewart, ¶21. The court noted that “[n]o other evidence was offered, either by
Stewart of by the State…” Stewart, ¶22.
This evidence was then applied to the definition of the preponderance of
the evidence standard. For the court of appeals, because Stewart’s testimony that
he was not informed was the only evidence about whether such a warning
occurred, and because that evidence “tended to prove that Stewart was not
informed of his right to counsel on appeal” it was “‘more likely than not’ that
Stewart was not so informed.” Stewart, ¶22.
This is logical, and uncontroversial. There is no presumption to apply to
the circumstances. There is not a presumption that the sentencing judge did
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inform Stewart of his right to appellate counsel, and thus no presumption that
Stewart had to overcome. Rather, when the hearing began, the district court
started from a neutral position, now knowing whether the court did or did not
provide the information. At the end of the hearing, the needle was pushed off
center by Stewart’s testimony toward the conclusion that it was more likely that
the information was not provided. That testimony, because it was admissible and
uncontradicted in the slightest, carried Stewart’s burden. The court of appeals
simple, elegant resolution of this question is the one this Court should adopt
itself.
III. The Deprivation of a Fundamental Right is Not Subject to
Harmless Error Standard of Review
In State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶20, 342 P.3d 789, this Court reversed the
court of appeals for failing to review Collins’ claim for reinstatement under a
harmless error analysis because “[b]oth Manning and rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure require that a defendant show that he has been ‘deprived’
of the right to appeal which implicitly requires the defendant to show that he
would have appealed had he been properly informed.” Moreover, Collins had not
shown an exception to the general rule that all errors are reviewed for
harmlessness. Id.
In Collins, a jury found him guilty of murder and aggravated robbery. He
and his counsel discussed appealable issues after the verdict.

Collins was

sentenced to consecutive prison terms. At sentencing, the district court failed to
comply with rule 22(c)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by not informing
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him of his right to appeal within 30 days.

However, Collins’ counsel again

advised him of his right to appeal after sentencing. No appeal was taken. Two
years later Collins, pro se, sent a letter to the district court about his lack of
appeal. The district court appointed new counsel and a Rule 4(f) motion was
filed. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶¶4-7. After the denial of that motion by the district
court, the court of appeals reversed but failed to require that the claim for
reinstatement be subject to a harmless error analysis. The issue as to “harm” was
whether Collins would have timely appealed had he been informed by the district
court that an appeal must be filed within 30 days. This Court remanded the
matter to the district court for that determination.
This Court concluded that there were no structural errors in Collins’ case.
Structural errors are not subject to harmless error review.

Id. at ¶45.

“[S]tructural error is reserved for a ‘very limited class of cases’ in which a
constitutional error so undermines the fairness of the proceedings that prejudice
must be presumed.” Id. (citations omitted). Collins argued that Penson v. Ohio,
see supra, applied to his case.

However, this Court found Penson to be

distinguishable:
There a defendant requested that his attorney file an appeal. The attorney
did so but also sought withdrawal from the case because he believed the appeal
was meritless. The appeals court allowed counsel to withdraw but then rejected
defendant's motion to have new counsel appointed. Instead, the court conducted
its own review of the record and ultimately affirmed all but one of the defendant's
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convictions. The Supreme Court concluded that it was "inappropriate to apply
either the prejudice requirement of Strickland or . . . harmless-error analysis"
because the defendant was "entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal."
Collins, ¶49 (citing Penson, 488 U.S. at 77-78).
Stewart asserts that unlike Collins, the United States Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in Penson is indistinguishable from his case where the failure of
the district court to inform Stewart of his right to counsel on appeal rendered him
“entirely without counsel on appeal.”
IV. Stewart’s only remedy for redress of the loss of his first right of
appeal, due to the denial of his right to appellate counsel, is
reinstatement of his first right of appeal
Of central focus to this Court’s decisions in Manning and Rees, and earlier
in Johnson, is the question of remedy for the denial or deprivation of the right to
a direct appeal.
In 1981, Johnson created a remedy—a procedural mechanism—where
criminal defendants could seek restoration of their right to appeal, when that
right was lost due to no fault of their own. That mechanism was a motion for resentencing in the underlying criminal matter, which would reset the time period
to appeal and guaranteed those defendants the right to counsel. Johnson, 635
P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), Manning, ¶16.
In 2005, this Court recognized that “the evolution of statutory law and
procedural rules since Johnson has foreclosed the usefulness of [that] remedy”
created in 1981. Manning, ¶14. At the heart of the decision in Manning was the
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need to fashion a “procedure for reinstating an unconstitutionally denied
criminal appeal.” Manning, ¶27 (“Since we have no remedy currently in place
under the PCRA or our rules of appellate procedure for reinstating an
unconstitutionally denied criminal appeal, we must again fashion such a remedy,
as we did in Johnson”). See also Stewart, ¶ 11. The procedure set forth in
Manning, of course, became rule 4(f).
However, in Manning, this Court ultimately denied her reinstatement of her
right to appeal. Manning had entered a plea with the assistance of counsel, and
filed a pro se notice of appeal 57 days after sentencing. By entering a plea, she
waived the right to appeal her conviction with no attempt to withdraw her plea.
Manning, ¶37. Accordingly, the only remaining right to appeal was in regards to
her sentence. Id. Manning received a favorable sentence and voiced no interest
in appealing it. Id. at ¶40. Though the district court failed to comply with rule
22(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as to advising Manning of the right
and requirements concerning an appeal of her sentence, Manning had another
remedy available to her besides reinstatement. She could file a motion to correct
an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) at any time. Id. at ¶41.
Similarly, in Rees, this Court concluded that reinstatement was not
appropriate because Rees was represented by counsel on appeal and the merits of
that appeal were reached (2001 UT App 27). Rees, 2001 UT 69, ¶2-3. This Court
denied Rees the right to a second direct appeal, concluding that he had a remedy
for his claim of appellate ineffectiveness under the Postconviction Remedies Act
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(now UTAH CODE §78B-9-106, rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). Id.
at ¶16.
However, Stewart has no other remedy available to him for the denial of his
right to appellate counsel as a necessary part of his right to a direct appeal.
Challenging the sentence, like in Manning, gets him nowhere because it is his
convictions (by a jury) that he seeks to have reviewed. Nor is he eligible for relief
under the PCRA. Even assuming he could get beyond the time bar of the PCRA
and rule 65C, he is not eligible for relief under any ground that “could have been
but was not raised at trial or on appeal,” or any ground that “may still be raised
on direct appeal”; and because he was not given access to appellate counsel he
has no issues of ineffectiveness of counsel, which could be raised, unlike Rees.
See UTAH CODE § 78B-9-106.
What Stewart has is the denial of the right to counsel as a necessary part of
his right to an appeal and access to the appellate process. Fundamental fairness
requires there be a remedy for that unconstitutional deprivation. A motion to
reinstate his appeal (time to appeal) under 4(f) was the only remedy available to
him.10

In the alternative, this Court—like it did in Tuttle—could reinstate his original appeal
(20030757-CA) through application of Rule 23A in combination with Rule 2 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure by finding that Stewart’s pro se failure to file appellant’s
brief was the result of excusable neglect and that any timeliness requirement for
reinstatement be suspended. See Tuttle, 703 P.2d 705 (discussed infra).
10
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CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the Stewart was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to appeal,
by being denied information and access to counsel on appeal, this Court should
affirm the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. Because Stewart’s testimony
satisfied the preponderance of evidence standard, this Court should affirm the
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.
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JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES JILL M. POHLMAN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
TOOMEY, Judge:
¶1
Calvin Paul Stewart was convicted in 2003 of seventeen
second and third degree felonies. Twelve years later, he filed a
motion to reinstate the period for filing a direct appeal, which
the court denied. He appeals the denial of that motion, arguing
that a criminal defendant’s right to appeal requires that the
defendant be informed of the right to counsel on appeal. We
agree and therefore reverse.

State v. Stewart

BACKGROUND
¶2
In 2001, the State charged Stewart with multiple securities
violations, including securities fraud and the sale of unregistered
securities. He was initially represented by private counsel, but
counsel later withdrew because Stewart could not afford to pay
him. The court appointed Stewart a public defender, but
ultimately Stewart decided to represent himself at trial. Stewart
was convicted and sentenced to prison on seventeen counts,
with each sentence to run consecutively.
¶3
With the help of a non-attorney friend, Stewart filed a
notice of appeal and a docketing statement, and this court set a
briefing schedule. Stewart expected his friend to help file a brief,
but the friend declined to do so when Stewart could not pay
him. Stewart failed to file a brief by the deadline, and this court
dismissed his appeal.
¶4
Over the next decade, Stewart filed various motions for
relief, including a motion to appoint counsel, a motion to correct
his sentence, and a motion for relief from what he characterized
as a void judgment. The district court denied each of these
motions. On one occasion, he appealed one of these rulings, and
this court affirmed the district court’s decision. See State v.
Stewart, 2010 UT App 367U (per curiam).
¶5
In 2015, Stewart filed a pro se “Motion to Reinstate Period
for Filing Direct Appeal” under rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which is the motion at issue in this appeal.
Stewart also filed a related motion to appoint counsel. The court
appointed a public defender to represent Stewart and, after
counsel filed an amended motion to reinstate Stewart’s direct
appeal, the court held an evidentiary hearing in early 2016.
¶6
At the hearing, Stewart testified that when the court
released the appointed public defender as his 2003 trial was
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approaching, the judge informed him that he would have to find
new counsel by a specific date or proceed without
representation. Stewart understood this to mean that if he chose
not to have appointed counsel at trial, he could not have
appointed counsel on appeal. Stewart testified that the court did
not inform him of the right to counsel on appeal during his trial
or at his sentencing hearing, and that had he known, he would
have requested counsel to assist with his appeal.
¶7
Stewart’s counsel argued that Stewart was deprived of his
right to appeal under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Counsel argued that even though Stewart filed a
notice of appeal, he was never informed of his constitutional
right to counsel on appeal, and without the help of counsel, he
was unable to file a brief to perfect his appeal. Counsel argued
that, because Stewart did not know and was not informed he
was entitled to appellate counsel, the time period for Stewart to
file an appeal should be reinstated.
¶8
The district court denied Stewart’s motion for three
reasons. First, Stewart’s “requests to represent himself in his
2003 jury trial and sentencing” and “his choice to proceed in his
appeal pro se” constituted a “constructive waiver of his right to
an attorney on appeal.” Second, Stewart’s motion failed on the
merits because his own failure to respond to the briefing
deadline caused his appeal to be dismissed. Third, Stewart’s
“mere claim” that he was not informed of his right to counsel
did not meet the threshold burden of proof in showing he had
been deprived of the right to appeal. Stewart appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9
Stewart contends the district court erred by denying his
motion to reinstate the time to file a direct appeal. We review the
court’s legal conclusion that Stewart was not deprived of his
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right to appeal for correctness and its underlying factual
findings for clear error. State v. Kabor, 2013 UT App 12, ¶ 8, 295
P.3d 193.

ANALYSIS
I. Stewart Was Deprived of the Meaningful Right to Appeal.
¶10 Stewart’s only contention on appeal is that the district
court erred in failing to reinstate the time to file his direct appeal
under rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Stewart
argues that, under the Utah and United States constitutions, a
criminal defendant must be informed both that he has a right to
appeal his conviction and that he has the right to counsel on
appeal. He argues that, because he was not advised of his right
to counsel on appeal, he was effectively deprived of his right to
appeal. 1

1. The State argues that Stewart was not deprived of his right to
appeal, because he filed a notice of appeal. The State cites State v.
Rees, 2005 UT 69, 125 P.3d 874, which states that “the act of
‘proceeding’ with an appeal encompass[es] filing a notice of
appeal, not more.” Id. ¶ 18; see also Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61,
¶ 31, 122 P.3d 628 (outlining some of the circumstances in which
a defendant can prove “that he has been unconstitutionally
deprived, through no fault of his own, of [the] right to appeal”).
Because Stewart filed a notice of appeal, the State argues he was
therefore not “prevented in some meaningful way from
proceeding” with his appeal. See Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶ 17
(quotation simplified); accord State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 42,
342 P.3d 789. But Rees is inapplicable here because Rees did not
contemplate a situation in which a defendant was denied the
right to appeal by being denied the right to counsel. Indeed, in
(continued…)
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A.

A Defendant’s Right to Appeal Includes Being Informed
of the Right to Counsel on Appeal.

¶11 The Utah Constitution guarantees the right to appeal in
all criminal prosecutions. Utah Const. art. I, § 12. “This shows
that the drafters of our constitution considered the right of
appeal essential to a fair criminal proceeding. Rights guaranteed
by our state constitution are to be carefully protected by the
courts. We will not permit them to be lightly forfeited.” State v.
Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985). To protect this right,
rule 4(f) allows a court to reinstate the thirty-day period for filing
a direct appeal for a defendant who “was deprived of the right
to appeal.” Utah R. App. P. 4(f). Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61,
122 P.3d 628, which led to the promulgation of rule 4(f), 2
explains that a defendant has been denied the right to appeal
when he “has been prevented in some meaningful way from
proceeding with a first appeal of right.” Id. ¶ 26 (quotation
simplified); see id. ¶ 24 (explaining that when a defendant is
“unconstitutionally denied his [or her] right to appeal” there
must be a “means of regaining that right”). Manning outlines
several possible circumstances that would demonstrate that a
defendant “ha[d] been unconstitutionally deprived, through no
fault of his own, of [the] right to appeal,” including, among
(…continued)
Rees, the defendant was represented by counsel, but alleged that
his counsel was ineffective. See 2005 UT 69, ¶ 9. The court in Rees
did not address whether the right to appeal includes the right to
be represented by counsel, or specifically whether a defendant
must be informed of the right to counsel on appeal.
2. The Advisory Committee Note to rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure explains that “[p]aragraph (f) was adopted
to implement the holding and procedure outlined in Manning v.
State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628.”
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others, situations in which “the court or the defendant’s attorney
failed to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal.” Id.
¶ 31.
¶12 The Utah Constitution also requires that an accused “be
provided with the assistance of counsel at every important stage
of the proceedings against him.” Ford v. State, 2008 UT 66, ¶ 16,
199 P.3d 892 (quotation simplified). And our supreme court has
recognized that the assistance of counsel is crucial to an appeal.
See Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 16 (“[T]he right to representation is
an integral part of the right to appeal . . . .”). As the Supreme
Court of the United States has stated,
The assistance of appellate counsel in preparing
and submitting a brief to the appellate court which
defines the legal principles upon which the claims
of error are based and which designates and
interprets the relevant portions of the trial
transcript may well be of substantial benefit to the
defendant. This advantage may not be denied to a
criminal defendant, solely because of his
indigency, on the only appeal which the State
affords him as a matter of right.
Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 259 (1967) (per curiam); see also
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963) (holding that the
right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment extends through appeal).
¶13 A defendant must be aware of this right in order to
exercise it. At the trial level, a defendant may only “knowingly
and voluntarily” waive the right to counsel. See State v. Graham,
2012 UT App 332, ¶ 19, 291 P.3d 243 (“Because a defendant’s
choice of self-representation often results in detrimental
consequences to the defendant, a trial court must be vigilant to
assure that the choice is freely and expressly made with eyes
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open.” (quotation simplified)). Though a defendant may be
informed of his right to counsel at the trial level, we cannot
assume that he is aware that he is also entitled to the assistance
of counsel on appeal unless he has been informed. If an indigent
defendant is not made aware of the right to counsel, he “has
been prevented in some meaningful way from proceeding with a
first appeal of right.” See Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 26 (quotation
simplified). As other courts have recognized, “[t]he right to
appeal at the expense of the state is mere illusion if the convicted
indigent defendant does not know such right exists.” United
States ex rel. Smith v. McMann, 417 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1969); see
id. (“We think the only practical, logical and fair interpretation to
be given to Douglas v. California[, 372 U.S. 353 (1963),] is that it
imposes upon the state a duty to warn every person convicted of
[a] crime of his right to appeal and his right to prosecute his
appeal without expense to him by counsel appointed by the
state.”); see also United States v. Aloi, 9 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 1993)
(reiterating the constitutional requirement to be advised of
appellate rights, including the right to counsel on appeal). 3

3. See also United States ex rel. Singleton v. Woods, 440 F.2d 835, 836
(7th Cir. 1971) (determining that the failure to advise an indigent
defendant of his right to court-appointed counsel on appeal
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Nichols
v. Wainwright, 243 So. 2d 430, 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)
(requiring that an indigent defendant, who has indicated the
desire to appeal, be informed of the right to counsel on appeal);
Cochran v. State, 315 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 1984) (requiring a
defendant to be “made aware of his right to counsel on appeal
and the dangers of proceeding without counsel”); State v. Allen,
239 A.2d 675, 677 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (concluding
that “both the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments require one to
be advised of his state-created right of appeal in addition to the
(continued…)
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¶14 We therefore conclude that a defendant is entitled to be
informed of his right to counsel on appeal, and this right is
inherent in a defendant’s right to an appeal. 4
B.

The District Court Erred By Denying Stewart’s Motion to
Reinstate the Time for Direct Appeal.

¶15 The district court gave three reasons for denying
Stewart’s motion to reinstate the time period to file a direct
appeal. First, it determined it need not reach the issue of whether
the right to appeal requires a defendant to be notified of the right
to counsel on appeal, because Stewart knowingly or
constructively waived his right to counsel on appeal by
repeatedly requesting to represent himself at trial and sentencing
and then proceeding pro se in his appeal.
¶16 A defendant does not constructively waive the right to an
attorney on appeal by opting to represent himself at the trial
level, and the State does not cite any controlling authority to the
contrary. Moreover, Stewart’s “choice” to proceed pro se on
(…continued)
right to counsel on an appeal”); cf. Sibley v. State, 775 So. 2d 235,
241–43 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (requiring waiver of the
constitutional right to counsel on appeal to be knowing and
intelligent); Casner v. State, 155 P.3d 1202, 1206–07 (Kan. Ct. App.
2007) (determining the defendant was not fully informed of his
rights on appeal when he was told he could appeal but was not
informed he had the right to an attorney on appeal).
4. Rule 22(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was
amended effective May 1, 2018, to require the sentencing court to
“advise the defendant of defendant’s right to appeal . . . and the
right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court if
indigent.”
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appeal did not constitute a waiver of his right to counsel on
appeal. We agree with Stewart that to effectively “choose” to
represent himself instead of requesting counsel requires
knowledge that he is entitled to have counsel appointed. Though
the court stated that Stewart “repeatedly was notified of his right
to counsel,” those notifications occurred at the trial level, with
respect to the trial, and there is no evidence the court informed
him he was entitled to the assistance of counsel on appeal. See
infra ¶ 22. We therefore conclude the court erred in determining
that Stewart constructively waived this right on appeal.
¶17 Second, the court stated that Stewart’s motion failed
under Manning. Manning allows a court to “reinstate the time
frame for filing a direct appeal where the defendant can prove
. . . that he has been unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault
of his own, of [the] right to appeal.” Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61,
¶ 31, 122 P.3d 628 (emphasis added). In this case, the district
court determined that “due to a clear pattern of conduct in this
case, Stewart [had] created, in his own actions, his own fault in
failing to meet the briefing deadline set forth by the Court of
Appeal[s],” and so Stewart’s appeal “was ultimately dismissed
. . . due to Stewart’s own failure to respond.”
¶18 But we have determined that failure to inform a
defendant of the right to counsel on appeal does not “properly
advise” the defendant, and thereby unconstitutionally deprives
the defendant, of the right to appeal. See id.; see also supra ¶ 14.
Through no fault of his own, Stewart was not informed of the
right to counsel and was, in that respect, effectively deprived of
the right to appeal. Although Stewart filed a pro se notice of
appeal and docketing statement, he cannot be faulted for not
perfecting his appeal by filing a timely brief where he was
unaware of his right to be assisted by counsel on appeal. See
Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 259 (1967) (“The assistance of
appellate counsel in preparing and submitting a brief to the
appellate court . . . may well be of substantial benefit to the
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defendant. This advantage may not be denied to a criminal
defendant, solely because of his indigency . . . .”). Stewart
testified that he would have requested counsel if he had been
properly informed, and the State noted counsel would have been
appointed had he requested it. Stewart thus missed the deadline
for filing his appellate brief because he was not assigned
appellate counsel who would have helped him navigate the
procedural requirements of an appeal and who would have
prepared and submitted a brief on his behalf. We therefore
disagree with the district court that Stewart created “his own
fault” by missing the briefing deadline set by this court.
¶19 Third, the district court stated there was insufficient
evidence that Stewart had not been deprived of the right to
appeal. Specifically, the court ruled that a “mere claim by Mr.
Stewart, 11 years after sentencing, that he is quite sure the
sentencing judge did not inform [him] of his right to the
appointment of appellate counsel is simply insufficient” to meet
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard required by rule
4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
¶20 We give deference to the court’s factual findings and will
“not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v.
Kabor, 2013 UT App 12, ¶ 8, 295 P.3d 193. Rule 4(f) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a district court to “enter
an order reinstating the time for appeal” if it “finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has
demonstrated that the defendant was deprived of the right to
appeal.” Under this standard, “the court needs only to balance
the evidence, using discretion to weigh its importance and
credibility, and decide whether the [defendant] has more likely
than not” been deprived of the right to appeal. See State v.
Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 82–83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (outlining the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof in the context
of a probation violation).
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¶21 Here, Stewart testified the district court did not “inform
[him] about [his] right to a have an attorney represent [him] on
appeal,” and that he would have asked for one to be appointed
had he been informed of that right. Admittedly, his testimony
was self-serving and not detailed. Stewart stated he could not
“remember a whole lot of exactly what [the trial judge] asked
[him],” and he did not have a “full memory of everything” that
was said to him from the bench. He testified that he wrote down
“certain things [he] wanted to remember” in a notebook and that
whether the court informed him of his right to an attorney on
appeal was “a fact that [he would] remember”: the court did not.
There are no transcripts from the sentencing hearing, 5 and the
State offered no evidence suggesting Stewart was informed of
his right to appellate counsel.
¶22 Although the district court has discretion to weigh the
importance and the credibility of the evidence, it characterized
Stewart’s testimony as a “mere claim” and stated the “lack of
evidence” did not meet the preponderance standard of proof.
We disagree. Stewart’s uncontroverted testimony was evidence
that he was not informed of his right to appellate counsel.
Stewart bore the burden of proof and offered his testimony as
evidence. No other evidence was offered, either by Stewart or by
the State, and the court did not make findings that Stewart’s
testimony was incredible or unreliable. 6 This means that the only
5. Though Stewart filed a pro se motion requesting “the entire
transcript of all recorded hearings,” only the transcripts from the
two-day jury trial were provided, and the recording of the
sentencing hearing is no longer available.
6. The court stated that “[a] mere claim by Mr. Stewart, 11 years
after sentencing, that he is quite sure the sentencing judge did
not inform [him] of his right to the appointment of appellate
counsel is simply insufficient” to meet the preponderance-of-the(continued…)
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evidence presented tended to prove that Stewart was not
informed of the right to counsel on appeal, thus making it “more
likely than not” that Stewart was not so informed. Because the
State offered no evidence to the contrary and because the court
did not find that the evidence presented was incredible or
unreliable, the court clearly erred in determining Stewart did not
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not
informed of the right to counsel on appeal.
¶23 Because the three reasons for the court’s determining that
Stewart was not deprived of his right to appeal are flawed, we
conclude it erred in making this determination. Thus, we reverse
its decision.

CONCLUSION
¶24 We conclude that a defendant is unconstitutionally
deprived of his right to appeal if he is not informed that he has
the right to the assistance of counsel on appeal. We also conclude
Stewart did not constructively waive his right to counsel on
appeal, did not create his own fault by missing the briefing
deadline, and provided sufficient evidence to meet the
preponderance standard under rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. We therefore reverse the district court’s
decision and remand for the court to reinstate the period for
Stewart to file a direct appeal.

(…continued)
evidence standard, and that this “lack of evidence” was critical
and dispositive. The court’s statement suggests Stewart needed
to provide more evidence to meet the preponderance standard,
not that the court found Stewart’s testimony to be incredible or
unreliable.
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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DURHAM, Chief Justice:
¶1
In this case, the petitioner seeks review of the court
of appeals’ decision that (1) a criminal defendant claiming
denial of the right to appeal must file a separate civil action
for relief pursuant to rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and (2) the State
is not required to prove a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right to appeal before a court may determine that the right to
appeal has not been unconstitutionally denied. We conclude that,
in light of revisions to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a
criminal defendant claiming denial of the right to appeal must
file a motion in the trial court for reinstatement of a denied
right to appeal under the exceptions outlined in this case,
rather than under rule 65C and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
We further hold that criminal defendants who fail to file a
notice of appeal within the required time period are presumed to
have knowingly and voluntarily waived this right and thus have

the burden to prove otherwise by establishing that one of the
exceptions defined in this case applies.
BACKGROUND
¶2
On July 12, 2001, pursuant to a plea agreement in which
additional charges against her were dropped, the petitioner,
Carolyn Manning, pled guilty to one count of failure to render a
proper tax return, a third degree felony; one count of unlawful
dealing of property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony; and
one count of third degree felony theft.
¶3
Manning’s written plea agreement explicitly waived
various rights otherwise accorded to criminal defendants,
expressed understanding that her unconditional guilty plea would
“not preserv[e] any issue for appeal relative to the Court’s
rulings on pre-trial motions or based upon statutory or
constitutional challenges,” and acknowledged that “by pleading
guilty/no contest I am waiving my rights to file an appeal.” The
plea agreement also acknowledged the thirty-day time limit set by
Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(a) for moving to withdraw a guilty
plea and recognized that the court would grant such a motion only
upon “a showing of good cause.”
¶4
At Manning’s plea hearing, the court reviewed her
“right to appeal a conviction” should she proceed to trial and
ensured that Manning understood that, by contrast, her “right to
appeal these pleas of guilty is very limited.” After a thorough
colloquy in which the court determined that Manning was “fully
competent” to participate in the proceedings, that her attorney
had “taken the time to extend himself to adequately and properly
serve [her], and [that she was] satisfied with his service,” and
that Manning understood both the charges and the consequences of
her guilty pleas and was entering her guilty plea “of [her] own
free will,” the court accepted her pleas and informed her that
she could move to withdraw them within thirty days.1
¶5
Manning was sentenced on September 27, 2001. Fiftyseven days later, while in custody, Manning filed a pro se notice
of appeal. The district court dismissed this notice of appeal as
untimely under rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
1

At the time, State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ¶ 11, 31 P.3d
528, which held that the thirty-day time period for withdrawing a
guilty plea runs not from the entry of the plea, but from “the
date of final disposition of the case at the district court had
not yet issued.”
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¶6
On July 31, 2002, Manning petitioned the district court
for an extraordinary writ that would “allow[] her to be
[re]sentenced nunc pro tunc[,] thereby extending the time in
which to file a notice of appeal, pursuant to rule 65B(b) and/or
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.” As the basis for this
request, Manning claimed that her attorney “did not inform her
that she could file a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of
judgment,” and that, as a result, her “right to appeal under
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution [had] been
violated.”
¶7
After a hearing on September 27, 2002, the district
court denied Manning’s petition, finding that Manning “was
represented by very competent counsel,” “was informed by the
court of her limited right to appeal,” and had “not established
that she was unconstitutionally denied her right to appeal.” The
court concluded that Manning had been sufficiently notified of
her limited right to appeal, but had “failed to timely exercise
[that] right” and was “therefore bound by her own failure to
exercise her right to appeal.”
¶8
Manning challenged the district court’s denial of her
petition in the court of appeals, arguing that her failure to
timely appeal did not constitute a knowing and voluntarily waiver
of her right to appeal. Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, ¶ 23,
89 P.3d 196. Affirming the district court, the court of appeals
ventured “to clarify the correct procedural approach” in cases
“where resentencing to resurrect the right to appeal is the
objective.” Id. ¶ 12. It concluded that the proper procedure
was to apply for relief under rule 65C, which it considered the
successor to rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
pursuant to which we had previously directed defendants claiming
denial of the right to appeal to file their petitions. Id.
¶¶ 10, 13 (citing State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981)).
The court also concluded that Manning was not eligible for relief
under Johnson, rejecting her argument that the State bore the
burden of proving that her failure to timely appeal constituted a
“knowing and voluntary waiver” of the right to appeal. Id. at
¶¶ 23, 25. Rather, the court held that a defendant who claims
that her right to appeal has been unconstitutionally “denied”
must show that her failure to exercise that right was the result
of interference that “originate[d] in the criminal justice
system” and was not simply the result of missing the deadline for
bringing an appeal. Id. ¶ 25.
¶9
We granted certiorari to consider (1) whether a
criminal defendant who seeks resentencing to revive the right to
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appeal pursuant to State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981),
must file a separate civil action pursuant to rule 65C rather
than requesting relief from the sentencing court in the
underlying criminal case and (2) whether a defendant’s request
for resentencing must be granted unless the record demonstrates
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to
appeal, and, if so, whether Manning knowingly and voluntarily
waived her right to appeal in this case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals for correctness, without deference to its conclusions of
law. In re A.T., 2001 UT 82, ¶ 5, 34 P.3d 228. The underlying
issue of the district court’s denial of Manning’s petition for
postconviction relief is a legal issue reviewed for correctness.
Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 9, 94 P.3d 211.
ANALYSIS
¶11 The first issue presented on certiorari requires us to
address whether the procedure previously laid out by this court
in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), to restore a denied
right to appeal continues to be available. We conclude that, in
light of the intervening revisions to rule 65B of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the promulgation of rule 65C, and the 1996
enactment of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-35a-101 (2002), the Johnson remedy is no longer able to
serve the purpose for which it was designed. We begin our
analysis by discussing the nature of the Johnson remedy,
concluding that it was essentially a hybrid of both coram nobis
and postconviction proceeding remedies. We also explain the
evolution of Utah statutory law and procedural rules and why they
render the Johnson remedy no longer functional. We then clarify
what constitutes a denial of the constitutional right to appeal
and outline a new procedure to restore the right to appeal for a
defendant who proves, under the framework we provide, that he has
not knowingly or voluntarily waived it. We then apply this new
framework to the circumstances of this case.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

The Johnson Remedy

¶12 In Johnson, we held that a criminal defendant who
reasonably relied on his attorney’s assurance that an appeal
would be timely filed was unconstitutionally denied his right to
appeal his conviction. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah
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1981). We then established a procedural mechanism to restore
this right in Johnson’s case and in future situations in which a
defendant was prevented from bringing a timely appeal through no
fault of his own. We directed defendants to file a motion for
resentencing in the trial court so that the thirty-day time
period for bringing an appeal set forth in rule 4(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure would begin to run anew. Id. at 38.
¶13 Manning urges us to retain the Johnson remedy because
it allows filing for relief in the underlying criminal case, thus
preserving the right to state-paid counsel in seeking an appeal.
She argues that the changes to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
have no impact on the remedy’s availability because the remedy is
based on the common law writ of error coram nobis2 and may
continue to function as such. In adopting the remedy in Johnson,
however, we described “[t]he postconviction hearing procedure
[under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as] a successor to the
common-law writ of error coram nobis,” and directed defendants to
seek relief under rule 65B(i). Id. The State accordingly argues
that since the Johnson remedy originally proceeded under rule
65B(i), it must now be sought under rule 65C, which it considers
the successor to former rule 65B(i), and the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code sections 78-35a-101 to -110
(2002).
¶14 Based on our analysis of Johnson and the Rules of Civil
Procedure, we conclude that neither party is entirely accurate in
its assessment of Johnson’s analytic sources. Rather, as
discussed below, the Johnson remedy was a hybrid of both coram
nobis and postconviction procedure principles, judicially
fashioned to preserve the constitutional right to appeal in
criminal cases. As we also discuss below, the evolution of
statutory law and procedural rules since Johnson has foreclosed
the usefulness of this remedy.
1.

Johnson’s Coram Nobis Foundation

¶15 We first examine the relationship between the common
law writ of error coram nobis and the Johnson remedy. In
Johnson, we examined other jurisdictions that had, by narrowly
expanding the common law writ of error coram nobis, permitted
“‘resentenc[ing] nunc pro tunc upon the previous finding of
2

“A writ of error coram nobis is a common-law writ of
ancient origin devised by the judiciary, which constitutes a
remedy for setting aside a judgment which for a valid reason
should never have been rendered.” 24 C.J.S. Crim. L. § 1610
(2004).
5
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guilt’” as a mechanism for restoring the time frame for filing an
appeal where the right to appeal had been denied. 635 P.2d at 38
(quoting People v. Callaway, 247 N.E.2d 127, 130 (N.Y. 1969)).
Under Utah common law, coram nobis had been available to “vacate
a judgment of conviction on the basis of facts which, without
defendant’s fault, did not appear on the face of the record and
as to which defendant was without other remedy.” Id. We
followed other courts in relying on coram nobis as a basis for
considering “extra-record facts” to establish the denial of the
right to appeal and vacate a judgment, after which the defendant
would be resentenced to establish a new appeal time frame. Id.
¶16 Coram nobis principles were thus essential to the
Johnson remedy. Consistent with the United States Supreme
Court’s coram nobis rulings in “right to appeal” criminal cases,
which direct that petitions be filed in the underlying criminal
case, James v. United States, 459 U.S. 1044, 1046 (1982); United
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 n.4 (1954), motions for
Johnson resentencing are filed in the underlying criminal case
rather than as separate civil proceedings, as would be required
if the remedy were based solely on rule 65B or its successor
postconviction procedures. This is an important element of the
Johnson remedy, partly for judicial economy in reviewing the
record, but mostly because an attorney’s assistance is not
guaranteed to indigent defendants in postconviction civil
proceedings. By contrast, a Johnson motion filed in the
underlying criminal case guarantees defendants the right to
state-paid counsel in seeking a first appeal. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-32-301(5)(2002). This is important because the right to
representation is an integral part of the right to appeal Johnson
sought to protect.
¶17 The State argues that former rules 65B(i) and 65B(b)
permitted the court to provide a pro bono attorney to an indigent
petitioner in civil postconviction proceedings, as does the
current PCRA section 78-35a-109(1). While the State is correct
on this point, the Johnson remedy was fashioned not just to
permit, but to guarantee, assistance of counsel in seeking a
first appeal of right in the underlying criminal case, in
accordance with coram nobis relief. See Beal v. Turner, 454 P.2d
624, 627 (Utah 1969).
¶18 The Johnson remedy also incorporates coram nobis
principles by placing the burden of proof establishing denial of
the right to appeal on the defendant. State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d
676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Manning incorrectly argues that
coram nobis and the Johnson remedy shift this burden to the
State; she asks us to require the State to prove a defendant’s
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knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal before a
court may deny petitions seeking to restore an appeal time frame.
However, coram nobis proceedings, whether styled as criminal or
civil, place on the defendant the burden of proving “by a
preponderence of evidence facts which will entitle him to
relief.” Sullivan v. Turner, 448 P.2d 907, 910 (Utah 1968); see
also United States v. Butler, 295 F. Supp. 2d 816, 818 (S.D. Ohio
2003). Likewise, the Johnson remedy requires petitioners, not
the State, to produce findings in the record or conduct a hearing
establishing the unconstitutional denial of the right to appeal.
Montoya, 825 P.2d at 679.3 This is necessary to prevent abuse by
those seeking to circumvent the timeliness requirements for
appeals. Id.
¶19 Therefore, notwithstanding our direction in Johnson
that defendants claiming denial of their right to appeal apply
for relief under rule 65B(i) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Johnson remedy itself relied on coram nobis principles
unavailable solely through rule 65B(i).4
2.

Johnson’s Postconviction Procedure Foundation

¶20 As previously discussed, in adopting coram nobis-type
relief in Johnson, we found “[t]he postconviction hearing
procedure” to be a successor to pleading the writ of coram nobis
and directed defendants to seek relief under rule 65B(i). 635
P.2d at 38. This was so because the 1977 version of rule 65B
abolished pleading “special forms of writs” in favor of “actions
under these Rules.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) (1977) (amended by
65B(b)(l)(1992)).
¶21 Additionally, rule 65B was well-suited as a procedural
avenue for seeking Johnson relief because it authorized the court
3

Montoya suggested that a claim of being “denied effective
assistance of counsel” at trial establishes a denial of a
constitutional right that warranted seeking Johnson resentencing
to resurrect an appeal. 825 P.2d at 679. Under the former rule
65B, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could indeed be
raised; now, as discussed below, rule 65C and the PCRA are the
proper means to seek relief for such claims except in the limited
situations defined by this case.
4

Manning additionally points out that Johnson-type relief
is permitted to be filed by motion rather than by complaint, as
required by rule 65B(i) and its successors, and argues that it is
therefore coram nobis and not postconviction relief. We do not
find this distinction determinative.
7
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to take action when there had been “a substantial denial of . . .
rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the
State of Utah,”5 Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i)(1)(1977) (amended by
65B(b)(l) (1992)), including the constitutional right to appeal.
Upon finding such a denial, rule 65B(i) authorized a court to
enter as a remedy an appropriate order, such as an order for
Johnson resentencing.6 Id. 65B(i)(8).
¶22 Therefore, both the mechanism for filing a claim in the
criminal case and the remedy via a resentencing order were
available under the 1977 version of rule 65B(i), and even the
extensive 1991 amendments to rule 65B did not interfere with
this.7 However, in 1996, the Legislature enacted the PCRA and
this court subsequently substantially revised rule 65B, wherein
former rule 65B(i) (or, after 1991, rule 65B(b)) became, in
revised and expanded form, rule 65C. As we explain below, these
changes affected the relief available under Johnson and the
former rules.
¶23 For one thing, a defendant may no longer file a
petition pursuant to rule 65B(b) in “instances governed by Rule
65C.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(1). In addition, the specific
grounds for which extraordinary relief may be sought under rule
65B are now enumerated in subsection (a) of that rule, and the
broad language permitting proceedings resulting from the
“substantial denial of rights,” constitutional or otherwise, no
longer exists. Id. 65B(b)(11).
¶24 Such language also does not appear in rule 65C, which
now “govern[s] proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction
relief filed under [the PCRA].” Id. 65C(a). The PCRA proclaims
5

“Any person imprisoned . . . under a commitment of any
court . . . who asserts that in any proceedings which resulted in
his commitment there was a substantial denial of his rights under
the Constitution of the United States or the State of Utah, or
both, may institute a proceeding under this Rule.” Utah R. Civ.
P. 65B(i)(1977)(amended by 65B(b)(1) (1992)).
6

The court was permitted to “enter an appropriate
order . . . as the court may deem just and proper” if relief was
warranted. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i)(8)(amended by
65B(b)(11)(1992)).
7

Under the 1991 version of rule 65B(b)(1) and (11), a
defendant was permitted to institute a proceeding “result[ing]
from a substantial denial of rights” and courts were allowed to
“enter an appropriate order” for relief. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B
(1992) (amended 1996).
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itself as a remedy “for any person who challenges a conviction or
sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other
legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in
Subsection (2).” Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(1) (2002).
Subsection (2) does not expressly address the situation where a
defendant has failed, for whatever reason, to timely file a
direct criminal appeal.8 Id. § 78-35a-102(2). Currently, rule
65C and the PCRA do not permit motions for Johnson relief for
defendants who have not filed a direct appeal because their right
to appeal has been unconstitutionally denied. While a defendant
who simply fails to file an appeal within the time limits
required by rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
would reasonably be considered to have exhausted any remedies he
might have obtained thereby for purposes of the PCRA, the same is
not true for a defendant who is unconstitutionally denied his
right to appeal. See State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1166 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) (Wilkins, J., concurring) (the “denial” of the
right to appeal consists of a defendant having “been prevented in
some meaningful way from proceeding with [his or her] appeal[]”).
Such a defendant must have a means of regaining that right. It
follows that there must be a mechanism for distinguishing those
defendants who have truly exhausted their remedy of direct appeal
from those whose right to appeal has been unconstitutionally
denied.
¶25 Therefore, the unintended result of the transformation
of rule 65B(i) since this court issued its decision in Johnson is
that a defendant who has been unconstitutionally denied a direct
criminal appeal may no longer seek Johnson relief under either
rule 65B or rule 65C and the PCRA. Because of this, and because
the Johnson remedy also independently relied on coram nobis
principles, we deem it inappropriate to continue to rely on the
Johnson remedy, and conclude that the restoration of a denied
direct appeal through resentencing to establish a new appeal time
frame is no longer feasible. Instead, we direct defendants who
claim denial of their right to appeal to follow the procedure set
forth below.

8

Rather, it allows defendants to file postconviction relief
petitions under rule 65B if they do “not challenge a conviction
or sentence,” if they are “motions to correct a sentence pursuant
to rule 22(e),” or if they are petitions regarding the “actions
taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.” Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-102(2) (1996).
9
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B.

New Remedy for Restoring a Denied Criminal Appeal

¶26 Although we have determined that the remedy laid out in
Johnson, which requires resentencing to restore a denied appeal,
is no longer available, we conclude that we must provide a
readily accessible and procedurally simple method by which
persons improperly denied their right to appeal can promptly
exercise this right. Virtually all jurisdictions provide some
procedural mechanism for restoring a denied right to appeal, and
we have a particular interest in doing so because of our
constitutional mandate to provide a criminal appeal “in all
cases.” Utah Const. art. I, § 12. Further, failure to provide a
direct appeal from a criminal case implicates the guarantee of
due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution,
State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 n.1 (Utah 1985), when a
defendant has “been prevented in some meaningful way from
proceeding” with a first appeal of right, Penman, 964 P.2d at
1166.
¶27 Since we have no remedy currently in place under the
PCRA or our rules of appellate procedure for reinstating an
unconstitutionally denied criminal appeal, we must again fashion
such a remedy, as we did in Johnson. A survey of procedures used
in other jurisdictions reveals that many provide a mechanism
through their postconviction remedy acts or rules of criminal or
appellate procedure.9 Others have established court rules that
assert jurisdiction over “appeals by leave” at the court’s
discretion, People v. Goecke, 547 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996), or grant a new appeal time frame through habeas corpus
petitions for out-of-time appeals, see, e.g., Odneal v. State,
161 S.W.3d 692, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Bowman v. Washington,
605 S.E.2d 585, 589 (Va. 2004).
9

For example, New York replaced its Callaway holding, on
which we relied in Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38, with a rule of
criminal procedure. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 460.30 (McKinney
1970) (extending the time for taking an appeal, “upon the
improper conduct of a public servant or improper conduct, death,
or disability of the defendant’s attorney, or (b) inability of
the defendant and his attorney to have communicated, in person or
by mail, concerning whether an appeal should be taken, prior to
the expiration of the time within which to take an appeal due to
defendant’s incarceration in an institution and through no lack
of due diligence or fault of the attorney or defendant”); see
also Esters v. State, 894 So. 2d 755, 757 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003);
State v. Rosales, 66 P.3d 1263, 1267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003);
Garrison v. State, 711 A.2d 170, 175 (Md. 1998); State v. Meers,
671 N.W.2d 234, 236 (Neb. 2003).
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¶28 While some jurisdictions continue the practice of
resentencing as a means of reinstating the time period for filing
an appeal, see, e.g., Jakoski v. State, 32 P.3d 672, 678 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2001); State ex. rel. Hahn v. Stubblefield, 996 S.W.2d
103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Tweed, 59 P.3d 1105, 1109
(Mont. 2002), others have found that such resentencing “tends to
create more problems than it resolves,” Boyd v. State, 282 A.2d
169, 171 (Me. 1971). We agree that resentencing is no longer a
preferred remedy. For one thing, our rules “governing amended
judgments” generally disfavor “enlarg[ing] the time for appeal”
by means of a “nunc pro tunc entry” which does not “chang[e] the
substance or character of the judgment.” State v. Garner, 2005
UT 6, ¶ 11, 106 P.3d 729. As the Johnson remedy was ultimately
designed to restore a denied right to appeal, we find it
appropriate to focus not on resentencing but on a more direct
mechanism to reinstate this right.
¶29 Having reviewed the differing procedural solutions
among jurisdictions, we conclude that Kansas’s approach is the
most useful. In Kansas, where “the filing of a timely notice of
appeal is [also] jurisdictional,” State v. Ortiz, 640 P.2d 1255,
1257 (Kan. 1982), the courts have developed a procedure, in the
interest of “fundamental fairness,” that provides for narrow
exceptions to the thirty-day jurisdictional rule that may open
the door to a new appeal time frame. Id. at 1258.
¶30 The Ortiz jurisdictional exceptions permit a defendant
to claim denial of the right to appeal in the trial court and to
establish the facts in support of this claimed denial by hearing
if necessary. Once the denial is established, Ortiz authorizes
courts to reinstate the appeal time frame, similar to the
operation of our Johnson remedy.10 While we do not adopt
Kansas’s specific procedures and relief (which are broader and
more complex than those we espouse), we view its approach of
10

See, e.g., State v. Dreiling, 54 P.3d 475, 490 (Kan.
2002) (appeal was reinstated when defendant’s attorney promised
to file an appeal but failed to do so); State v. Parker, 934 P.2d
987, 991 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (Ortiz exceptions could not be
used to grant an appeal where “one does not exist by law”); State
v. Thomas, 900 P.2d 874, 876 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (the rule was
“developed in the interest of fundamental fairness” and therefore
a defendant does not qualify for the exception if that interest
would not be “substantially further[ed]”); State v. Cook, 741
P.2d 379, 381 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (defendant did not qualify for
the exceptions when the record revealed no evidence to support
the claim, and an evidentiary hearing was not required).
11
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establishing narrow exceptions by case law as serving the
interest of fundamental fairness and as an appropriate mechanism
to provide the relief granted in Johnson. The Maine Supreme
Court helpfully notes that restoring a right to appeal by direct
petition is appropriate because “‘[i]f the District Court has the
power to set aside the judgment and resentence, it certainly
would have the power to grant the right of appeal since it
accomplishes the results intended.’” Boyd, 282 A.2d at 172
(quoting Everett v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 1170 (C.D. Cal.
1969)); see also Thompson v. Commonwealth, 736 S.W.2d 319, 322
(Ky. 1987).
¶31 Accordingly, we hold that, upon a defendant’s motion,
the trial or sentencing court may reinstate the time frame for
filing a direct appeal where the defendant can prove, based on
facts in the record or determined through additional evidentiary
hearings, that he has been unconstitutionally deprived, through
no fault of his own, of his right to appeal. Such circumstances
would include: (1) the defendant asked his or her attorney to
file an appeal but the attorney, after agreeing to file, failed
to do so, see Johnson, 635 P.2d 36; (2) the defendant diligently
but futilely attempted to appeal within the statutory time frame
without fault on defendant’s part, see id.; or (3) the court or
the defendant’s attorney failed to properly advise defendant of
the right to appeal, see State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1061
(Utah 1993).11
¶32 Our resolution of this issue allows us to address the
second question before us on certiorari-–namely, whether a
defendant’s request for resentencing must be granted unless the
record demonstrates that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived her right to appeal. We clarify that the State does not
bear this burden of proof. Rather, in a criminal case where a
defendant has failed to appeal within the required thirty-day
time period, the defendant bears the burden of proving she has
not knowingly or voluntarily waived the right to appeal. As was
required by the Johnson remedy, the defendant must demonstrate by
a “preponderence of evidence” that she qualifies for any of the
exceptions listed above. See Sullivan, 448 P.2d at 910. Only if
she succeeds in doing so will a court determine that she has been
unconstitutionally denied this right. In such a case, the trial
or sentencing court is directed to reinstate the appeal time
frame if doing so is in the interest of fundamental fairness.

11

We have distilled this list of exceptions from our case
law and a survey of those relied on in other jurisdictions. We
note that this list is not intended to be exclusive.
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The defendant must then file a notice of appeal within thirty
days of the date the trial court issues its order.
¶33 We expressly state that the procedure set forth here is
not available to “a defendant properly informed of his appellate
rights” who simply “let[s] the matter rest, and then claim[s]
that he did not waive his right to appeal.” Ortiz, 640 P.2d at
1258. Thus, in the vast majority of cases where a defendant
fails to comply with the rule 4(a) thirty-day requirement for
filing a timely appeal, or with the rule 4(e) provision for
requesting an extension of the time to appeal “upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause,” the defendant will be held to
have waived his right to appeal and the claim will properly be
dismissed. State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 5, 57 P.3d 1065;
State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah 1989).
II.

MANNING’S CLAIM OF BEING DENIED AN APPEAL UNDER
THE NEW MANNING EXCEPTIONS

¶34 We now turn to Manning’s claim that she was deprived of
her constitutional right to appeal. In resolving this issue, we
must first consider the nature of Manning’s appeal rights and
then analyze them under the framework just established.12
¶35 A defendant who knowingly and voluntarily waives his
right to appeal has not been unconstitutionally denied that
right. State v. Mortensen, 73 P. 562, 566 (Utah 1903) (stating
that provisions in article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution
are for the accused’s benefit, and can be waived). While “courts
generally indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver” of
constitutional rights, Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1155
(Utah 1996), a defendant found to have expressly waived them, by,
for example, entering a knowing and voluntary guilty plea where
the plea agreement expressly indicates such a waiver, no longer
enjoys the benefit of these constitutional protections.13
12

For the sake of expediency, we do not require Manning to
file a new motion in the trial court under our new framework, nor
do we remand for an additional evidentiary hearing, as we believe
the record contains sufficient evidence to resolve Manning’s
claim.
13

See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah
1996) (right to appear and defend in person waived); State v.
Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah 1989) (right to public trial
waived); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 138 (Utah 1989)(right to
jury trial waived) (abrogated on other grounds); State v. Wilson,
(continued...)
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No. 20040453

¶36 Manning cites Weaver v. Kimball, 202 P. 9, 10 (Utah
1921), for the proposition that defendants who enter guilty pleas
remain entitled to the article I, section 12 right to appeal. It
is true that a defendant does not waive the right to appeal
simply by entering a guilty plea. Id. However, it is well
established that this right will be considered waived where the
defendant enters a knowing and voluntary guilty plea pursuant to
a plea agreement that expressly waives the right to appeal and is
entered in accordance with the procedural safeguards of rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Corwell, 2005
UT 28, ¶ 21, 114 P.3d 569. Any challenge to such a plea
agreement, or to the waivers contained therein, may only be
undertaken following a timely motion for withdrawal of the guilty
plea. State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ¶ 3, 40 P.3d 630.
¶37 Manning waived the right to appeal her conviction by
entering a knowing and voluntary guilty plea pursuant to a plea
agreement that expressly indicated she would waive her right to
appeal. Manning could only contest this waiver by first filing a
timely motion to withdraw her guilty pleas and then establishing
that her pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Id. She was
correctly informed at her plea hearing that she had thirty days
to file a motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. Despite our
decision in State v. Ostler, which was issued after Manning’s
plea hearing and which clarified that the thirty-day time frame
for withdrawal of guilty pleas begins on the date of “final
disposition,” 2001 UT 68, ¶ 11, 31 P.3d 528, Manning has never
sought to withdraw her guilty pleas and admits she was not
prejudiced by this alleged failure to inform her at the time of
sentencing that she could withdraw her guilty pleas thirty days
from that date. Manning, 2004 UT App 87 ¶ 29 n.9. Since she
could not appeal her conviction or the knowing and voluntary
nature of her guilty plea, any remaining rights to appeal were
necessarily limited to appealing her sentence.
¶38 We analyze Manning’s remaining right to appeal her
sentence under the previously defined exceptions. The first
13

(...continued)
563 P.2d 792, 793 (Utah 1977)(right to counsel waived); State v.
Long, 506 P.2d 1269, 1270 (Utah 1973) (privilege against selfincrimination waived); State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 706
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)(right to appeal waived by unconditional plea
agreement, foreclosing inquiry into loss of speedy trial rights
without withdrawal of guilty pleas); Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d
1038, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (right against being placed in
double jeopardy may be waived by a plea agreement).
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exception applies when the defendant has asked her attorney to
file an appeal and, after agreeing to do so, the attorney fails
to file the appeal. The record clearly indicates that this
exception does not apply here. Manning met with her attorney
“three to four times after sentencing was imposed,” and “at no
time did she ask for him to pursue an appeal.” Manning’s
attorney “first learned about an appeal after it was filed”
fifty-seven days after sentencing. Prior to this, her attorney
did not know of Manning’s desire to pursue an appeal, never
agreed to file an appeal, and thus did not fail to file Manning’s
appeal.
¶39 The second exception applies when the defendant has
diligently but futilely attempted to appeal within the statutory
time frame without fault on the defendant’s part. This exception
also does not apply here. Manning’s untimely pro se attempt to
appeal was filed fifty-seven days after sentencing. The record
reveals no evidence that Manning made any attempt to pursue her
appeal within the statutory thirty-day time frame or that any
attempts were prevented or rendered futile without fault on her
part. Nor has Manning suggested any facts that would indicate
any interference that would have prevented her from filing her
appeal in a timely manner.
¶40 The third exception applies where the court and the
defendant’s attorney have failed to provide the defendant with
notice of the right to appeal. Manning had knowledge of her
constitutional right to appeal. Before entering her guilty plea,
Manning was advised by both the court and her attorney of her
right to appeal in accordance with rule 11(e). As described
above, Manning repeatedly acknowledged in her plea affidavit and
during the plea colloquy that her attorney had informed her that
her right to appeal was limited. We further conclude that
Manning’s attorney had no duty to further discuss with Manning
her limited appeal rights after sentencing, considering her
favorable sentence, the knowing and voluntary nature of her
guilty plea, and Manning’s express waiver in the plea agreement
of “some or all appeal rights.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.
470, 480 (2000) (rejecting a “bright-line rule that counsel must
always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.”).
Manning has not suggested that she did not understand that she
did in fact have a right to appeal her sentence, nor that she had
any interest in challenging her sentence on appeal. Indeed,
given the fact that Manning received a favorable sentence as a
result of her guilty plea, it seems unlikely that she would have
any such interest. We therefore conclude that Manning’s attorney
sufficiently informed Manning of her right to appeal.

15
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¶41 Rule 22(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
however, requires the court to notify the defendant after
sentencing of the right to appeal and the time limits for filing
such an appeal.14 Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c). There is no
indication in the record that the court complied with rule 22(c)
at the sentencing hearing. Again, however, the only appeal left
to Manning at that time was in regard to her sentence, and, as
just mentioned, Manning does not claim her right to appeal her
sentence has been denied. While the court’s failure to comply
with rule 22(c) may well qualify for the third exception where a
defendant has claimed that his right to appeal his sentence has
been denied, Manning has made no such claim. We further note
that rule 22(e) permits a motion to correct a sentence at any
time.15 Thus, should Manning wish to have her sentence reviewed,
relief remains available to her under that provision. As the
exceptions set forth above have been established in the interest
of fundamental fairness, and we do not believe these interests
are in any way furthered by granting a new appeal time frame
here, we deny Manning’s request to reinstate the time frame for
bringing an appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶42 A criminal defendant may no longer seek Johnson
resentencing to restore a denied right to appeal. Rather, we set
forth a new procedural mechanism for this purpose, requiring a
defendant to file a motion in the trial court for reinstatement
of a denied right to appeal under the exceptions outlined above.
These exceptions permit defendants to file a motion in their
underlying criminal cases in the trial court, thereby qualifying
them for assistance of counsel in restoring a denied right to
appeal pursuant to article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution. While defendants who fail to meet statutory
14

Rule 22(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states

that
upon a verdict or plea of guilty . . . the
court shall impose sentence and shall enter a
judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the
sentence. Following imposition of sentence,
the court shall advise the defendant of
defendant’s right to appeal and the time
within which any appeal shall be filed.
15

Rule 22(e) states: “The court may correct an illegal
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any
time.” Utah R. Crim P. 22(e).
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timeliness requirements for bringing an appeal are generally
presumed to have waived their right to appeal, defendants may
prove they have not knowingly or voluntarily waived their
constitutional rights to appeal by establishing that they have
been unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault of their own,
of their right to appeal. The right to appeal may then be
restored if it is in the interest of fundamental fairness to do
so. The defendant in this case has failed to demonstrate a
constitutional denial of her right to appeal that justifies
restoration of the appeal time frame under this new procedure.
--¶43 Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice
Durham’s opinion.
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Addendum C – State v. Rees, 2005 UT 69, 125 P.3d 874

2005 UT 69
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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NEHRING, Justice:
¶1
We granted certiorari to review the procedure and
remedy selected by the court of appeals to provide a defendant
who claimed that he had been denied a meaningful appeal due to
the ineffectiveness of his counsel. We hold that the postconviction procedure and remedy extended to Mr. Rees by the court
of appeals were not available to him and therefore reverse.
BACKGROUND
¶2
Troy Rees was convicted of possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute. He appealed to the court of appeals,
challenging the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress
evidence together with his conviction. The court of appeals
affirmed Mr. Rees’s conviction on three grounds. First, the
court stated that the record before it was incomplete because it
was missing the preliminary hearing transcript, the suppression
hearing transcript, and the affidavit in support of the search
warrant. Because the issues presented were “highly fact

sensitive,” the court of appeals concluded that a complete record
was “essential.” The court of appeals affirmed Mr. Rees’s
conviction, relying on the principle that “[i]n the absence of an
adequate record on appeal, we cannot address the issues raised
and presume the correctness of the disposition made by the trial
court.” State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
¶3
The court of appeals further determined that Mr. Rees
failed to adequately marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court’s finding that he possessed marijuana with intent to
distribute. Owing to this insufficiency, the court of appeals
affirmed this finding. Finally, the court of appeals ruled that
Mr. Rees failed to provide an adequate record to support his
contention that the trial court erred when it allowed the State
to refile its information after dismissing the case against
Mr. Rees without prejudice when witnesses for the State failed to
appear at two preliminary hearings. The court of appeals again
presumed the correctness of the trial court’s ruling in absence
of an adequate record to the contrary. State v. Rees, 2001 UT
App 27U (“Rees I”).
¶4
After receiving the court of appeals’ decision,
Mr. Rees’s counsel contacted the court clerk to find out what had
happened to the missing portions of the record. The court clerk
discovered that although Mr. Rees’s counsel had in fact requested
all the relevant proceedings, the missing transcripts had been
placed on a different shelf than the rest of the record and had
not been filed with the court of appeals.
¶5
After learning of this mistake, Mr. Rees, through the
same counsel who had represented him throughout the trial and
appeal, filed a petition for post-conviction relief with the
trial court under rule 65B(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In his petition, Mr. Rees asked that his sentence be
reentered so that he could refile his appeal. Mr. Rees did not
articulate a clear reason why he believed to be entitled to this
relief, but rather indicated generally that he did not receive a
meaningful appeal because some of the records had not been filed
with the court of appeals. In his petition, he suggested,
without explicitly stating it, that his attorney had been
ineffective in supervising aspects of Mr. Rees’s appeal. The
trial court dismissed Mr. Rees’s petition and imposed the
original sentence, finding that the case had already been
adjudicated in the court of appeals.
¶6
appeals.

Mr. Rees appealed this dismissal to the court of
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s
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dismissal of Mr. Rees’s petition, and remanded the matter for
further consideration. In its opinion, the court of appeals
treated Mr. Rees’s petition as a writ of error coram nobis1
predicated on a claim for relief based on ineffective assistance
of counsel. State v. Rees, 2003 UT App 4, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 120
(“Rees II”). The court of appeals determined that because
Mr. Rees had not yet had the opportunity to argue his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, he was entitled to post-conviction
relief in the trial court. The court of appeals remanded the
case, instructing the trial court to determine whether Mr. Rees
was entitled to coram nobis relief and to “grant [his] petition
and reenter his sentence nunc-pro-tunc” if he prevailed. Id.
¶ 15.
¶7
The State petitioned this court for a writ of
certiorari. We granted the State’s request for certiorari review
to take up the questions of whether the court of appeals erred in
(1) treating the petition as a writ of error coram nobis; (2)
reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for
extraordinary relief; and (3) inviting the trial court to reenter
Mr. Rees’s sentence nunc pro tunc, should it find that the
defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a
meaningful appeal because of his reliance on ineffective counsel.
¶8
On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not that of the trial court, giving no deference to the
court of appeals’ conclusions of law. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004
UT 16, ¶ 7, 86 P.3d 742. We reverse on these issues.
ANALYSIS
¶9
We confront here the question of whether the writ of
error coram nobis is available to provide a remedy to a defendant
who claims that his appeal was defectively prosecuted because his
appellate counsel was ineffective. The court of appeals held
that it was and remanded the matter to the trial court for the
1

“Coram nobis” is a Latin term meaning “the error before
us.” A writ of error coram nobis is an ancient common law writ
that exists to “correct fundamental errors which render a
criminal proceeding irregular and invalid.” Cardall v. United
States, 599 F. Supp. 912, 914-15 (D. Utah 1984). We have held
that the writ of error coram nobis can be “used by a sentencing
court to modify or vacate a judgment of conviction on the basis
of the facts which, without defendant’s fault, did not appear on
the face of the record and as to which the defendant was without
other remedy.” State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981),
superseded by Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628.
3
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purpose of ascertaining whether Mr. Rees was denied his right to
appeal because of his counsel’s ineffectiveness. If the trial
court found for Mr. Rees on his ineffective assistance claim, the
court of appeals instructed it to resentence Mr. Rees nunc pro
tunc.
¶10 In reaching this result, the court of appeals rejected
the State’s contention that if Mr. Rees was entitled to relief,
he must pursue it under the provisions of Utah’s Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102 (Supp. 2004) (“PCRA”),
and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets out
the procedures that complement the substantive provisions of the
PCRA.
¶11 The court of appeals justified fashioning coram nobis
relief for Mr. Rees by linking it to the procedure grounded in
the writ that we announced in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah
1981). The court of appeals was drawn to Johnson because Johnson
provided defendants who have been denied a right to appeal a
mechanism to revive their right. Under the Johnson procedure, an
eligible defendant could seek resentencing in the trial court
nunc pro tunc. This procedure would entitle a defendant to the
benefit of appointed counsel, and, were it determined that he had
been denied his constitutionally guaranteed right of appeal, a
recommencement of the thirty-day period to file his notice of
appeal. By making this connection, the court of appeals
suggested that the circumstances surrounding its affirmance of
the trial court in his prior appeal, circumstances that possibly
amounted to a denial of his “right to a meaningful appeal,” Rees
II, 2003 UT App 4, ¶ 16, 63 P.3d 120, constituted the legal
equivalent of the denial of his right to appeal that led us to
create the Johnson remedy. The validity of the court of appeals’
belief that these two situations were factually and legally
comparable is the inquiry upon which our holding hinges.
¶12 The court of appeals went on to reason that the
enactment after Johnson of rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure governing petitions for extraordinary relief did not
erode the utility of Johnson’s coram nobis based procedure
because we had “at least obliquely” reaffirmed the coram nobis
relief it announced. Id. ¶ 5 n.2.
¶13 Regardless of whether we professed our prior allegiance
to Johnson directly or obliquely, we unequivocally discarded the
Johnson procedure in Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628.
In its place, we erected a sturdier, less contrived framework for
a defendant who has been unconstitutionally denied his right to
appeal to refresh his opportunity to perfect his appeal. We
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noted in Manning that we could not simply do away with the
Johnson remedy because were we to do so we would have “no remedy
currently in place under the PCRA or our rules of appellate
procedure for reinstating an unconstitutionally denied criminal
appeal.” Id. ¶ 27.
¶14 Of course, an indication that no remedy exists in
statute or rule to make real the promise afforded by a
constitutional right gives rise to questions of what tool should
be deployed to protect that right. Although formally abolished
by rule in 1977,2 extraordinary writs embody the procedure
traditionally used to protect such a right. In Manning we filled
the void created by the demise of the Johnson post-conviction
hearing procedure with a procedure crafted in no small measure of
parts taken from the writ of error coram nobis, most prominently
its guarantee of appointed counsel. Id. ¶ 16. Although not
styled as an extraordinary writ, the Manning procedure
accomplishes the same objective.
¶15 One way, then, to ascertain whether some fashion of
coram nobis relief was due Mr. Rees even after our rejection of
the Johnson post-conviction procedure is to explore whether
Mr. Rees had no other remedy available to him. The answer to
this question turns on whether an affirmance of conviction
attributable to the ineffective assistance of counsel may
constitute a denial of the right to appeal. We conclude that it
does not. We will explain how we reach this conclusion shortly,
but we first state why it matters.
¶16 If the PCRA provides Mr. Rees an adequate remedy at
law, he is not entitled to secure extraordinary relief but must
instead pursue his PCRA remedy. PCRA section 78-35a-102(1)
provides that the PCRA “establishes a substantive legal remedy
for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a
criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies,
including a direct appeal,” subject to certain exceptions not
germane to this case. The PCRA, then, preempts access to other
forms of extraordinary relief, including the remedy afforded by
coram nobis, by defendants who satisfy the conditions of section
78-35a-102(1). Mr. Rees is such a defendant and therefore must
seek his remedy under the PCRA.

2

The 1977 version of rule 65B abolished pleading “special
forms of writs” and replaced them with “action under these
Rules.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) (1977) (amended by 65B(b)(1)
(1992)).
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¶17 We surmised in Manning that “a defendant who simply
fails to file an appeal within the time limits required by rule
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure would reasonably be
considered to have exhausted any remedies he might have obtained
thereby for purposes of the PCRA.” Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 24.
These defendants have not been denied their right to appeal, but
have rather been deemed to have waived it. A different legal
status attaches to them than to those defendants who have been
unconstitutionally denied their right to appeal. We have
interpreted a “denial” to have constitutional implications when a
defendant has “been prevented in some meaningful way from
proceeding with [his] appeal[].” Id.
¶18 We construe the act of “proceeding” with an appeal to
encompass filing a notice of appeal, not more. Defendants who
gain entry to appellate courts and have their appeals concluded
either by a ruling on the merits or involuntary dismissal have
exhausted their remedy of direct appeal and are thereby drawn
into the ambit of the PCRA.
¶19 We find it telling that the court of appeals described
the claim for which it found coram nobis relief appropriate the
denial of Mr. Rees’s “right to a meaningful appeal because of the
ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel.” Rees II, 2003
UT App 4, ¶ 16 (emphasis added). This characterization of the
circumstances that would merit the intercession of coram nobis is
substantially different than our description of the essence of an
unconstitutional denial of the right to appeal. Both employ the
word “meaningful.” As we used the term in Manning, “meaningful”
modifies the type of conduct or circumstance that deprived a
defendant of access to the appellate process. As used by the
court of appeals here, “meaningful” modifies “appeal” and
strongly indicates that coram nobis is available to provide an
additional direct appeal to a defendant whose appeal has resulted
in an unfavorable outcome that can be traced to the ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. This interpretation creates a
scenario that plausibly could be claimed in every unsuccessful
post-conviction appeal and carry with it the prospect of having
the seldom-used writ of coram nobis swallow the PCRA.
CONCLUSION
¶20 Based on the foregoing, we hold that Mr. Rees’s claim
does not implicate an unconstitutional denial of his right to
appeal and that despite the unfavorable outcome of his appeal, he
has exhausted his right to appeal and is therefore required to
prosecute his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under
the PCRA and rule 65C.
---
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¶21 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Parrish concur in Justice Nehring’s
opinion.
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